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Marcello Guarini is the new chair of the APA Committee on 
Philosophy and Computers. Warm welcome, Marcello!  In 
his note from the chair, Marcello presents an ambitious 
project of bringing the charges of the committee up to date 
with the actual role it plays; much has changed in the area 
of philosophy and computers over the last two decades. 
Marcello’s article on artificial companions opens Part II of 
the current issue.
Ron Chrisley and Aaron Sloman open Part I of this issue 
with their article “Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia.” 
Chrisley and Sloman discuss revisionism about qualia—the 
view that tries to navigate between naïve qualia realism and 
reductive eliminativism. The authors discuss the relevance 
of their approach to AI. They also relate to the works they view 
as following the main tenets of revisionism about qualia. 
This includes Gilbert Harman’s version of functionalism, 
discussed in much detail (including Harman’s article 
“Explaining the Explanatory Gap,” published in the spring 
2007 issue of this newsletter) and also the psychomotoric 
approach to qualia by Kevin O’Regan.
The first four contributions in this issue relate to topics in 
philosophy of mind and consciousness relevant for robotics; 
this includes a philosophical cartoon by Riccardo Manzotti, 
which I decided to place next since it is a perfect follow-up 
to the paper by Chrisley and Sloman. Manzotti advocates 
what he calls relativism between objective and subjective 
properties as a way to bridge the mind body gap (or the 
Hard Problem of Consciousness). While I would use the 
word “relationism” rather than “relativism,” the project is 
presented persuasively (I am currently under the influence 
of O’Regan’s psychomotoric view, which seems to give a 
simpler explanation that goes in a similar direction). The 
article by J. White and J. Tani also deals with the Hard 
Problem. The authors discuss the use in human and robot 
cognitive architectures of the notion of h-consciousness 
and add their own notions of most-consciousness and myth-
consciousness (based on Fuchs 2016). The essay moves 
from analytical to phenomenological considerations.
The last section (Section 4), based on the work of J. Tani, 
will be of special interest to those into neurorobitics. The 
focus on the relevance of time for person-creation and the 
“motivational potential arising as horizons of anticipation are 
projected due normal adolescent neural development,” is a 
perfect segue into the article by J. Vallverdú and M. Talanov. 
Their article argues that humanoid robots should actually 
be aging. Since human life has a limited time horizon, a 
humanoid robot without having—and understanding that 
it has—such time horizon would not be humanoid in an 
important sense. The authors present quite controversial 
points targeted at gerontocracy (those points may reflect 
the experiences in some non-democratic countries, when 
death of the leader, not the elections, provide the best 
opportunity for change)—perhaps we should not preclude 
a longitudinal, perhaps modular, neural network able to 
learn and adapt. It could be designed in such a way that 
it increases in the relevant functionalities over millennia; 
let us call it an aleatory network. Designing one may be a 
worthy challenge.
The second part of the issue is devoted to robot ethics. We 
open with the article by Marcello Guarini, which pertains to 
the very timely issue of artificial companions. The author 
builds an argument trying to hit the golden mean between 
the skepticism or even pessimism of Sherry Turkle and 
Luciano Floridi’s well-known optimism. Guarini focuses on 
the benefits for our life and character that come from caring 
for our significant others, which may be undermined by 
extensive use of advanced robotic caregivers of the future. 
Next, Sean Welsh, our first contributor from New Zealand, 
presents some philosophical ideas towards formalization 
of the hard problems of ethics, such as the trolley cases. 
Welsh follows on the work of Jim Moor and others who use 
the need for formal solution in building ethics sub-routines 
for self-guiding robots as an opportunity to clarify our best 
intuitions in applied ethics. We close with a discussion 
between Scott Forshler and Roxanne Kurtz about the 
moral and ontological status of avatars, which pertains to 
Roxanne’s paper presented at the APA and published in an 
earlier issue of this newsletter.
FROM THE CHAIR
Marcello Guarini
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR
As the new chair of the APA Committee on Philosophy and 
Computers, I thank Thomas Powers for his leadership of 
the committee over the past few years. Tom’s selfless and 
consultative approach has made it a pleasure for all of us 
to work with him. The committee, and the community of 
scholars served by it, are better off as a result of Tom’s 
efforts.
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NP: There is nothing that has (or: Nothing could 
have) all the properties that qualia realists take to 
be essential to qualia.
NE is then thought to follow from NP so obviously that the 
step is rarely, if ever, explicitly mentioned or justified. Some 
of Daniel Dennett’s arguments against the reality of qualia 
can be seen as taking this form. “Quining Qualia” (1988), for 
example, employs such a strategy, the properties operative 
in the NP step being intrinsicness, ineffability, privacy, and 
immediacy. (In what follows, we will be assuming that these 
properties, as elucidated by Dennett, are indeed what 
qualia realists take to be constitutive of qualia. Much of 
what we have to say does not depend on this assumption.)
Revisionists, on the other hand, accept many or all of 
the arguments against there being features of conscious 
experience that are intrinsic, ineffable, private, and 
immediate, but depart from the eliminativists by not 
denying that qualia exist—with the proviso that qualia 
may not be what many people, (other) qualia realists and 
eliminativists alike, think they are. That is, revisionists hold 
NP but deny (or at least remain agnostic about) NE. (For 
ease of exposition, we will initially assume revisionists 
are qualia realists, but will return to the agnostic option in 
section 2.3.3.) In particular, revisionists deny that the NE 
follows from the NP. (How can that be so? We say more 
about that in section 2.1.)
Another way of expressing the difference between qualia 
revisionism and qualia eliminativism is in terms of the 
distinction between illusion and hallucination. Standardly, 
illusion is “any perceptual situation in which a physical 
object is actually perceived, but in which that object 
perceptually appears other than it really is,”2 while the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines a hallucination 
to “an experience which seems exactly like a veridical 
perception of an ordinary object but where there is no 
such object there to be perceived.”3 Thus, Blackmore: “To 
say that consciousness is an illusion is not to say that it 
doesn’t exist, but that it is not what it seems to be more like 
a mirage or a visual illusion.” So a reasonable alternative 
name for revisionism would be “illusionism.” However, 
despite this widely accepted distinction between illusion 
and hallucination, some use the term “illusion” to include 
cases where, they claim, there is no object being perceived. 
For example, Frankish proposes “illusionism” as a name for 
the position “which holds that phenomenal consciousness 
is an illusion and aims to explain why it seems to exist.”4 
According to the standard distinction, “hallucinationism” 
might be a more accurate (although perhaps less catchy) 
name for the position Frankish is advocating.
Some more examples of qualia revisionists may be helpful. 
Many (but not all) of those who embrace the “Grand Illusion” 
view of consciousness5 are revisionists about consciousness 
in general, and some may be revisionists about qualia in 
particular. A particularly clear-cut case of a revisionist about 
qualia is Derk Pereboom; cf. his “qualitative inaccuracy 
hypothesis”: “[I]ntrospection represents phenomenal 
properties as having certain characteristic qualitative 
natures, and it may be that these properties actually lack 
such features.”6 Another clear qualia revisionist is Drew 
The APA has requested that the committee examine its 
charge or mission, so we will be reflecting on how we 
might modify our official charge. As the pages of our 
newsletter reveal, the community we serve has interests in 
the philosophy of artificial intelligence and computational 
cognitive science, the philosophy of information, issues 
in the philosophy of computer assisted pedagogy, and 
various ethical issues pertaining to the development and 
uses of computers, the Internet, robotic technology, and 
much more. There is some concern that the varied content 
of our newsletter might not be adequately reflected in 
the committee’s current charge. For this reason, we will 
be examining how we might update our charge (mission 
statement), which currently reads as follows:
The committee collects and disseminates 
information on the use of computers in the 
profession, including their use in instruction, 
research, writing, and publication, and it makes 
recommendations for appropriate actions of the 
board or programs of the association.
I encourage everyone who has suggestions about the 
charge of the committee to send them to me: mguarini@
uwindsor.ca. Whether you think the charge should stay the 
same or be modified, we would like to hear from you. We 
also solicit any comments people might have about the 
name of the committee. Much appreciated if the comments 
could be submitted no later than December 31, 2016.
I look forward to working with my colleagues on the 
committee—Colin Allen, William Barry, Gary Mar, Fritz J. 
McDonald, Susan Schneider, Dylan E. Wittkower, and Piotr 
Boltuc—to serve the community of scholars interested in 
bringing philosophical reflection to bear on the wide range 
of issues involving computing and information sciences 
and technologies.
MIND ROBOTICS
Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia
Ron Chrisley
UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX
Aaron Sloman1
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
1. REVISIONISM ABOUT QUALIA
Eliminativists about qualia (e.g., Dennett; Frankish, 
forthcoming) make this claim:
NE: Qualia do not exist.
(For those that consider that wording paradoxical, NE can be 
glossed as “The term ‘qualia’ does not refer to anything.”)
Some eliminativist arguments for NE proceed by first 
arguing for NP:
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[A] successful explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness . . . should
1) explain how phenomenally conscious states 
have a subjective dimension; how they have 
feel; why there is something which it is like to 
undergo them;
2) why the properties involved in phenomenal 
consciousness should seem to their subjects to 
be intrinsic and non-relationally individuated;
3) why the properties distinctive of phenomenal 
consciousness can seem to their subjects to 
be ineffable or indescribable;
4) why those properties can seem in some way 
private to their possessors; and
5) how it can seem to subjects that we have 
infallible (as opposed to merely privileged) 
knowledge of phenomenally conscious 
properties.
Note that the first constraint does not have the “explain 
why it seems that” form the others do. This is important, 
as it highlights a possible explanatory advantage of the 
revisionist strategy as compared to the eliminativist one. 
The advantage concerns dealing with the worry: “How can 
consciousness be a hallucination, since only a conscious 
subject can suffer from a hallucination?” This is not the 
place to give a full assessment of this worry and responses 
to it, but the basic point we wish to highlight here is that 
in some situations, the revisionist view has more room 
for maneuver in replying to objections than does the 
eliminativist view. For example, consider L:
L: A subject has qualia iff there is something it is 
like to be that subject.
Perhaps some qualia eliminativists would reject L. (For 
example, it might be that the only sense they can attach 
to “there is something it is like to be X” is no different 
from the sense of “X is conscious,” though more obscurely 
expressed, and yet they are not eliminativists about 
consciousness.) But suppose for the sake of argument 
that both a qualia revisionist and a qualia eliminativist 
agreed on L. Then it follows that the qualia eliminativist 
must deny that there is something it is like to be a subject. 
And this can indeed be hard to square with also believing 
that consciousness is a hallucination, since it seems that 
only someone for whom it is like something to be them 
can suffer from a hallucination. But for revisionists, things 
are not so problematic. Yes, only someone for whom it is 
like something to be them can suffer from an illusion. But 
since revisionists do not deny that there are qualia, they 
can accept L and still hold that it is like something to be a 
subject, and thus that subjects can be victims of illusions 
(and hallucinations), including the illusions that qualia are 
intrinsic, immediate, ineffable and private. So, at least in 
some cases, the revisionist (illusionist) does not run into 
self-defeating trouble with the claim that consciousness is 
an illusion in the way the eliminativist (hallucinationist) runs 
McDermott, who has explicitly embraced7 the revisionist 
account of qualia put forward in our earlier work,8 and 
which is restated here in sections 2.1 and 2.2.2. On the 
other hand, Michael Graziano’s attention schema theory is 
hard to categorize as revisionist or eliminativist. Although 
in describing his theory he says things such as “awareness 
exists only as a simulation,” which would put him in the 
eliminativist/hallucinationist camp, he also distances 
himself from such a simple metaphysical position:
The attention schema theory could be said to 
lie half-way between two common views. In his 
groundbreaking book in 1991, Dennett explored a 
cognitive approach to consciousness, suggesting 
that the concept of qualia, of the inner, private 
experiences, is incoherent and thus we cannot truly 
have them. Others, such as Searle, suggested that 
the inner, subjective state exists by definition and is 
immune to attempts to explain it away. The present 
view lies somewhere in between; or perhaps, in 
the present view, the distinction between Dennett 
and Searle becomes moot. In the attention schema 
theory, the brain contains a representation, a rich 
informational description. The thing depicted in 
such nuance is experienceness. Is it real? Is it not? 
Does it matter? If it is depicted then doesn’t it have 
a type of simulated reality?9
One last terminological twist is that Frankish uses the term 
“weak illusionism” to refer to revisionism as defined above:
[Illusionism] should be distinguished from a 
weaker view according to which some of the 
supposed features of phenomenal consciousness 
are illusory. Many conservative realists argue 
that phenomenal properties, though real, do not 
possess the problematic features sometimes 
ascribed to them, such as being ineffable, 
intrinsic, private, and infallibly known. Phenomenal 
feels, they argue, are physical properties which 
introspection misrepresents as ineffable, intrinsic, 
and so on. We might call this weak illusionism, in 
contrast to the strong form advocated here.10
Frankish’s definition of illusionism is helpful in highlighting 
a responsibility that both revisionist and eliminativist 
(illusionist and hallucinationist) accounts of qualia incur: 
the duty of explaining why things seem other than they are. 
For revisionists, however, this responsibility takes a form 
different from the eliminativist duty Frankish mentions. 
Even if technically correct, it would be misleading to 
describe the responsibility for the revisionist as that of 
“explaining why qualia seem to exist,” since the standard 
reading of that phrase presupposes, unlike the revisionist, 
that qualia don’t exist. Given that we are initially assuming 
that revisionists are realist about qualia, it would be more 
usual to describe their corresponding responsibility as that 
of explaining how we have knowledge of the existence 
of qualia. Beyond this, however, the revisionist needs to 
explain why qualia seem to have the properties that they 
seem to have, despite not having them. Carruthers, another 
revisionist, is very clear on this point:
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the evolutionary history of current highly conscious and 
intelligent organisms, and in the individual developments 
between a newly fertilized egg and the adult crow, monkey, 
squirrel, elephant, or philosopher.
Although these “extra” constraints will not play a central role 
in this paper, we should clarify one thing before moving on. 
In taking on board these biological constraints, we do not 
thereby commit ourselves to the view that only biological 
organisms can be conscious, have qualia, etc. On the 
contrary, we believe that ideally, a theory of consciousness 
should explain how, in principle, artificial intelligence 
products, such as future household robots, could also have 
various forms of consciousness, possibly including visual 
and tactile qualia, for example, and whether this could be 
implemented in current digital technology or whether some 
other sort of implementation would be needed (e.g., based 
partly on chemical computation, which Turing suggested 
was true of brains12).
Finally, any revisionist account of anything, qualia included, 
has to deal with charges of changing the subject. In the case 
of qualia, opponents of revision (eliminativists and realists 
alike) might insist that “qualities of experience that are 
ineffable, immediate, intrinsic, and private” is just what we 
mean by “qualia.” So whatever a qualia revisionist is talking 
about (defending, explaining, etc.), they are not talking 
about qualia. We will discuss how two different revisionist 
accounts of qualia attempt to repel these charges in 2.1 
and 2.2.1. It is to these accounts that we now turn.
2. FUNCTIONALISM AND REVISIONISM
With the revisionist strategy in view, in what follows we 
would like to clarify it further by comparing two functionalist 
revisionist accounts of qualia: our own proposal, which can 
be called “Virtual Machine Functionalism” (or VMF),13 and 
Gilbert Harman’s account.14
2.1 THE VIRTUAL MACHINE FUNCTIONALISM 
ACCOUNT OF QUALIA 
Technically, the VMF proposal isn’t revisionist in the sense 
expounded in section 1 (the reasons why not will be made 
clear in section 2.2.3). But the VMF account does embrace 
the key (ontologically conservative) revisionist belief that 
NE does not follow from NP.
The VMF approach assumes that there are various working 
designs for information-processing architectures for more 
or less intelligent (or at least competent) systems (i.e., 
organisms, or, possibly, artificial systems), some of which 
allow the system to attend to and acquire information 
about some of the intermediate data-structures involved in 
processing sensory information, and to discover differences 
between changes that are produced by changes in the 
physical environment and changes that result from changes 
in the perceiver—e.g., alterations of viewpoint, looking 
through distorting lenses, screwing up eyes, tapping lower 
eyelid, or developing new introspective capabilities, e.g., 
as a result of attending art school, or engaging in systematic 
self-observation.
into self-defeating trouble with the claim that consciousness 
is a hallucination.
Returning to Carruthers’ explanatory desiderata: 
Eliminativists (hallucinationists) will have similar explanatory 
obligations, but given the existentially negative nature 
of their position, two changes would have to be made to 
Carruthers’ criteria:
1) Constraint 1 would likely need to be converted 
into the same “explain why it seems that” 
format as constraints 2–5.
2) Eliminativist obligations are not well expressed 
in language that presupposes the existence of 
qualia and the properties of qualia. Instead, 
they are more easily stated in terms of 
explaining the subject’s linguistic behavior.
Thus we would have as desiderata the requirements to 
explain why people say such things as:
1) “Phenomenally conscious states have a 
subjective dimension,” “Phenomenally 
conscious states have feel,” and “There 
is something which it is like to undergo 
phenomenally conscious states”
2) “Phenomenal consciousness is intrinsic and 
non-relationally individuated”
3) “The properties distinctive of phenomenal 
consciousness are ineffable or indescribable”
4) “The properties distinctive of phenomenal 
consciousness are private to their possessors”
5) “We have infallible (as opposed to merely 
privileged) knowledge of phenomenally 
conscious properties”
Which is, in essence, the heterophenomenological approach 
(Dennett). Revisionism can therefore be viewed as a kind 
of ontologically conservative heterophenomenology:11 
in explaining people’s (especially philosophers’) qualia 
talk, do not assume that qualia have the properties 
that people attribute to qualia in such talk (that’s the 
heterophenomenological part), but do assume (or at least 
leave open the possibility; see section 2.3.3) that the 
features of experience that people (incorrectly) attribute 
those properties to, namely qualia, do exist (that’s the 
ontologically conservative part).
By highlighting Carruthers’ desiderata, we do not mean to 
suggest that they are the only constraints on a satisfactory 
theory of qualia. A naturalistic theory of qualia of the sort 
we aspire to should not merely attempt to specify what 
qualia are and why they seem to be the way they seem, 
but should also explain how instances could have been 
brought into existence by natural processes occurring on 
an initially lifeless planet and how many intermediate forms 
of consciousness (and qualia), and supporting mechanisms 
(physical and virtual machinery) were required both in 
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concepts do not preserve reference. The VMF account can 
ensure sameness of reference by relying on a causal theory 
of reference: it is hypothesized that the word “qualia” 
refers to whatever virtual machine states, substates, and 
processes cause and regulate our use of that word. Those 
virtual machine components can also be referred to by 
using the terms and concepts of a sufficiently accurate and 
detailed architectural account of the subject in question.15 
In such a case, co-reference is preserved, and so revision 
without changing the subject is accomplished.
It should be stressed that this model of scientific progress 
(a causal theory grounding sameness of reference to a 
subject matter in the face of a shift from a less correct to 
a more correct conceptualization or theory of that subject 
matter) is hardly new.16 It is a standard way to make sense 
of the notion that the ancients had an incorrect account of 
the same stuff that our account of gold is of, rather than 
having a correct account of something else (since they had 
different concepts than we have now). What is more likely 
to strike some as novel is the application of this idea to the 
case of qualia talk instead of, e.g., gold talk.
2.2 HARMAN’S ACCOUNT OF QUALIA AND 
COMPARISON WITH VMF
We turn now to a comparative discussion of Harman’s 
account of qualia. There are some broad points of 
agreement between his account and the VMF account: 
both are functionalist and accept that qualia as standardly 
construed are problematic, either in themselves, or in 
their recalcitrance with respect to functionalist modes 
of explanation. And in both accounts it is the standard 
understanding of qualia which has to be given up, not 
functionalism or qualia themselves. That is, both accounts 
are revisionist in spirit. But there are some notable 
differences between them, some of which are revealed in 
their answers to three questions: “Are we aware of qualia?” 
“Are inverted qualia possible?” and even “Do qualia exist?” 
We now discuss the two accounts’ answers to these 
questions, in turn.
2.2.1 ARE WE AWARE OF QUALIA? 
A key part of Harman’s account is brought to the fore in 
his response to a standard, qualia-based objection to 
functionalist accounts of consciousness: 
When you attend to a pain in your leg or to your 
experience of the redness of an apple, you are 
aware of an intrinsic quality of your experience, 
where an intrinsic quality is a quality something 
has in itself, apart from its relations to other 
things. This quality of experience cannot be 
captured in a functional definition, since such a 
definition is concerned entirely with relations, 
relations between mental states and perceptual 
input, relations among mental states, and relations 
between mental states and behavioral output.17
Harman’s response centers on making a distinction 
between two kinds of features in play in experience: 
Not all such discoveries are available for all systems or 
for all intermediate information structures. Some sensory 
details may be constantly overwritten, and in some cases, 
although they are used for online control in sensory-
motor control loops, it may be that no records of the 
intermediate states are made available for “higher level” 
cognitive processing, or preserved for later inspection. 
For example, some of the internal states and processes of 
feature-detectors used for high-speed control of actions 
may be inaccessible to scrutiny. This would imply that 
changes in such states cannot be detected. The same 
goes for many information processes involved in metabolic 
functions (in normal circumstances, though, some of them 
change during infections and the changed states become 
detectable, e.g., during an attack of flu).
Moreover, the VMF approach allows that there may be 
several intermediate levels of abstraction in sensory/
perceptual or motor processing, some but not necessarily 
all of which may be accessible to internal self-monitoring. 
This is obvious in language understanding and production 
(e.g., acoustic, phonological, phonemic, morphemic, 
lexical, and various syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic 
levels of processing). Only expert linguists are (or can 
easily become) aware of all of them, though all normal 
language users use them all. It may be possible for some 
individuals to develop various new sub-skills if they 
have extendable/trainable portions of their information 
processing architectures. However, these abilities are not 
all there from birth, and how the required mechanisms 
(architectural layers) develop is mostly unknown.
The heart, then, of the VMF account of qualia is the proposal 
that qualia are properties of the virtual machine states or 
components of those states that give rise to qualia talk 
(or qualia thoughts). It may seem, to the subject whose 
currently running virtual machinery includes such states or 
sub-processes, or data-structures, that these properties are 
immediate, intrinsic, ineffable, and private, but (the VMF 
account proposes that) such a subject is incorrect, and the 
fact that these properties seem that way to the subject in 
which they are manifested can be explained in terms of 
their informational properties (for details, see 2.2.1 and 
2.2.2). This is the sense in which the VMF account of qualia 
is a revisionist one.
A further attraction of the VMF account, which we can 
do no more than note here, is its potential to integrate 
its constitutive and revisionistic explanations of qualia 
with explanations of their phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
origins and dynamics, which we proposed as being further 
constraints on a naturalistic account of consciousness in 
section 1.
As also pointed out in section 1, any revisionist account 
of anything, qualia included, has to deal with charges of 
changing the subject. The proponent of the VMF account 
is free to reply that to make that charge against them 
would be to confuse meaning and reference. Obviously, 
one can use different concepts (meanings) to talk about 
(refer to) the same thing. The revisionist is proposing we 
use different concepts to talk about a previously talked 
about subject, and is changing the subject only if those 
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to ordinary visual experience. When Eloise sees 
a tree before her, the colors she experiences are 
all experienced as features of the tree and its 
surroundings. None of them are experienced as 
intrinsic features of her experience. Nor does she 
experience any features of anything as intrinsic 
features of her experience.
Harman concludes by underlining the generality of Eloise’s 
case in a way that is meant to hit home: 
And that is true of you too. There is nothing special 
about Eloise’s visual experience. When you see a 
tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic 
features of your experience. Look at a tree and try 
to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your 
visual experience. I predict you will find that the 
only features there to turn your attention to will be 
features of the presented tree, including relational 
features of the tree “from here.”
We can now ask: in what sense, if any, is Harman’s 
account revisionist? One indication that it is revisionist is 
that the account is susceptible to a particular criticism, a 
susceptibility that is characteristic of revisionist accounts. 
The criticism, first mentioned in section 1, is that it changes 
the subject. Naïve (that is, non-revisionist) qualia realists 
could object that, in the sense of “intrinsic character” they 
use to characterize qualia, it is impossible that one not 
be aware of the intrinsic character of one’s experience—
“intrinsic character” is precisely meant to pick out the 
A-features of experience. So even if Harman is right in 
claiming that the C-features and A-features can come 
apart, “intrinsic character,” they might argue, should track 
the latter, not the former. For these naïve qualia realists, 
qualia may indeed be what give experiences the content 
they have. But it is more central to the notion of qualia that 
they are qualities of which the subject of an experience 
is aware. Harman is in effect claiming that naïve qualia 
realists are wrong that there is anything “mental” one 
becomes aware of when one introspects (NP), but denying 
that this means there are no qualia, since qualia are the 
(non-introspectable) intrinsic properties of experience.
Although a full discussion of this “transparent” view 
of qualia is not possible here, we can say that crucial 
phenomenological argument on which Harman relies 
(involving Eloise, above) is not persuasive, at least not to 
us. When we turn our attention to the intrinsic features of 
our visual experience, our attention is drawn, at least some 
times, to what we referred to as “features of the mode of 
perception.”19 For example, it is a feature of my mode of 
perception of the monitor in front of me now that there is 
more legible detail near my current point of fixation, and 
that this increased level of detail moves as my point of 
fixation changes. These are not features of the monitor, nor 
are they experienced as such, at least not when I turn my 
attention to my experience. More importantly, they are not 
experienced as features of the monitor itself, nor are they 
experienced at all in the absence of introspection. Another 
example is one’s awareness of motion when one gently 
wiggles one’s lower eyelid with a finger, while looking at 
the tree. Our sensorimotor systems are good at determining 
•	 Features by virtue of which an experience has the 
content it has (call them C-features)
•	 Features that one is made aware of by virtue of 
having an experience (call them A-features)
Harman argues that these are typically conflated, but are 
in fact disjointed.  An experience presents something (call 
it the object of the experience) as being some way, as 
having some feature, character, or quality. It is the object 
of experience and the features that experience represents 
that object as having that a subject is made aware of by 
virtue of having that experience. The experience does 
not, Harman argues, have that feature itself.  Nor does it 
present itself as having that feature. So one is not, by virtue 
of having an experience, made aware of the features of 
that experience, or at least not the intrinsic features of that 
experience by virtue of which it has the content it has.
Harman then deems these C-features to be the intrinsic 
features or intrinsic character of experience, allowing him 
to conclude that we are not aware of the intrinsic character 
of our experiences. The reply to the qualia-based objection 
to functionalism then comes swiftly: “[S]ince you are not 
aware of the intrinsic character of your experience, the fact 
that functionalism abstracts from the intrinsic character of 
experience does not show it leaves out anything you are 
aware of.”
However, the objection which Harman posed against 
himself did not invoke the experience of pain in one’s leg 
or experiencing a red apple, but the more introspective 
cases of attending to those experiences. So while one may 
concede that Harman is right that in normal experience 
the intrinsic qualities of those experiences may be 
inaccessible, one might yet suspect that this is not true for 
the introspective case at hand. Nonetheless, Harman insists 
the introspective case is the same as the non-introspective 
case.18 Thinking that they aren’t, that introspection can 
somehow reveal the intrinsic features of experience in a 
manner similar to how one can inspect the features of a 
painting by virtue of which it has its content, is, he claims, to 
make a false analogy between experiences and paintings: 
Things are different with paintings. In the case of 
a painting Eloise can be aware of those features 
of the painting that are responsible for its being 
a painting of a unicorn. That is, she can turn her 
attention to the pattern of the paint on the canvas 
by virtue of which the painting represents a 
unicorn. But in the case of her visual experience 
of a tree, I want to say that she is not aware of, 
as it were, the mental paint by virtue of which 
her experience is an experience of seeing a tree. 
She is aware only of the intentional or relational 
features of her experience, not of its intrinsic 
nonintentional features.  Some sense datum 
theorists will object that Eloise is indeed aware of 
the relevant mental paint when she is aware of an 
arrangement of color, because these sense datum 
theorists assert that the color she is aware of is 
inner and mental and not a property of external 
objects. But, this sense datum claim is counter 
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One might wonder how N could have E as its object. Given 
that N and E are distinct experiences, if a subject is having 
experience I, then she is ipso facto not having experience 
E, and thus, while the subject is having N, there is no 
experience E to serve as the object of N. At best, N can 
have as its object a memory or other representation of E 
that exists at the same time as N.
There is more than one way to respond to this worry. One 
response notes that the worry relies on the following 
assumption concerning the temporal relation between 
perception and the objects of perception (exteroception 
and interoception alike):
T: For x to be the object of a perception at time t, x 
must exist at time t.
This assumption can be questioned. Of course non-existent 
objects cannot enter into relations, but that is not required 
here. All that is required is that a relation can hold at time t 
between an object that exists at time t and another object 
that exists at a time earlier than t. In fact, we find it natural 
to say that a subject is seeing a distant star (and not seeing 
a representation or memory of that star), even in the case 
where the star in question ceased to exist millions of years 
before the subject’s birth.
Another line of response is to maintain that N and E can exist 
at the same time. For example, it might be that a subject 
can have more than one distinct experience simultaneously, 
or that experiences can have other experiences as proper 
parts. VMF is well poised to make sense of these proposals 
by way of identifying22 experiences with components of 
virtual machine states and processes, given that it explicitly 
differs from standard functionalism in allowing for functional 
sub-states that can be tokened simultaneously, or nested.
However, if one still had doubts about these mereological 
possibilities for experiences, there is a third line of 
response that explicitly draws on features of the VMF 
version of revisionist functionalism in a different way. If 
qualia are identified with (or implemented in; see footnote 
4) properties of virtual machine states, then it may very well 
be that one can only be having an experience with a given 
quale if one is in the corresponding VMF state. But it is 
possible to get information about, or “inspect” VMF states 
that are not tokened by inspecting the computational 
structures that are responsible for their deployment and 
implementation. So even if E must be tokened at t in order 
to perceive E at t, and even if having an introspective 
experience N precludes being in experiential state E at the 
same time, one can still make room for the “inner target” 
view of introspection by taking the relation between N and 
E to be intentional, but non-perceptual. By virtue of being 
in N one can be made aware of the features of E because N 
is causally related to the computational determinants of E.
By the computational determinants of a virtual machine 
state E we mean the currently tokened computational 
states and properties that, once a triggering condition for 
E’s tokening is met, will jointly determine that it is E that is 
tokened, as opposed to some other virtual machine state 
E’. For example, my computer is not now running the Firefox 
whether changes to the sensorimotor manifold are due to 
changes in what is being perceived, or something to do 
with the changes in the perceptual apparatus/perceiver.20 
Is it so improbable that this distinction might make itself 
apparent in phenomenal consciousness?
This phenomenological counter-argument and alternative 
model of introspection is not meant to be a decisive 
refutation of Harman’s view. Our phenomenological clash 
here is merely touching on a well-established debate 
between two views of introspection, the traditional “inner 
target” view, which can be traced back via Armstrong to 
Locke, and “transparency” views like Shoemaker’s (and 
Harman’s) that replace the idea that introspection is a 
kind of inner sense with the claim that it is rather a way 
of attending to the qualities of the perceived object (even 
if that object has to be an intentional object in the case 
of non-veridical, perception-like experiences). We do not 
presume to resolve this dispute here; rather, we wish to 
highlight this disagreement as a key difference between 
our functionalist account of qualia and Harman’s. For those 
functionalists who do not wish to embrace the view that we 
are not aware of the intrinsic qualities of our experiences, 
there is an alternative.
Although functionalism and the “inner target” view of 
introspection are both well-known, traditional views in 
the philosophy of mind, they come together in the VMF 
account of qualia in a novel way. On the VMF account, 
when one introspects, one is having an experience21 (N) the 
object of which is that (or another) experience (E), such that 
N represents E as having particular features, character, or 
qualities f. Further, it might be claimed, it is these features f 
of E that give E the content it has (i.e., that make it the case 
that E has an apple as its object and that E is presenting that 
object as being red). Harman may be right that a subject is 
not made aware of f by virtue of having E (which instead 
makes available an apple and redness). But, plausibly, one 
is made aware of f by virtue of having experience N, the 
introspection of E.
On the VMF account it is also the case that along with 
any experience E and features f of E that you are aware of 
by virtue of having introspective experience N, there will 
be many aspects of the information processing episode 
that you are (merely) potentially aware of (e.g., that you 
would become aware of if you reflected on other cases, 
or if something happened to draw your attention to 
differences between two experiences that involve changing 
relationships). For example, if you dimly experience a 
familiar face reflected in a window, you may fail to notice 
that part of the experience concerns the distance of the 
face. But you might come to notice that if the reflected face 
moved closer. For the VMF theorist, this merely points to 
the fact that the content of a vast amount of processing 
does not receive attention, but is capable of doing so, 
as distinct from other processing where the information 
used is beyond the reach of (normal) consicousness, e.g., 
low-level acoustic processing of speech sounds or visual 
processing of colors (which appears to be non-relational 
but is highly “relational” as shown by various illusions).
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2.2.2 ARE INVERTED QUALIA POSSIBLE? 
Another well-known objection to functionalist accounts 
of qualia is based on the notion of spectrum inversion. 
Harman summarizes the problem:
[I]t is conceivable that two people should have 
similarly functioning visual systems despite the 
fact that things that look red to one person look 
green to the other, things that look orange to 
the first person look blue to the second, and so 
forth (Lycan 1973, Shoemaker 1982). This sort 
of spectrum inversion in the way things look is 
possible but cannot be given a purely functional 
description, since by hypothesis there are no 
functional differences between the people in 
question. Since the way things look to a person is 
an aspect of that person’s mental life, this means 
that an important aspect of a person’s mental life 
cannot be explicated in purely functional terms.24
Harman introduces us to Alice and Fred, an inverted 
spectrum pair: “Things that look red to Alice look green to 
Fred, things that look blue to Alice look orange to Fred.”25 
He then gives us a quick theory of perception in which 
perceptual representations, which have enough causal 
efficacy to serve as guides, play a central role:
Perceptual processing results in a perceptual 
representation of that strawberry, including 
a representation of its color. [Alice] uses this 
representation as her guide to the environment, 
that is, as her belief about the strawberry, in 
particular, her belief about its color.26
Harman then offers a solution which has at its heart this:
The hypothesis of the inverted spectrum objection 
is that the strawberry looks different in color to 
Alice and to Fred. Since everything is supposed 
to be functioning in them in the normal way, it 
follows that they must have different beliefs about 
the color of the strawberry. If they had the same 
beliefs while having perceptual representations 
that differed in content, then at least one of them 
would have a perceptual representation that was 
not functioning as his or her belief about the color 
of the strawberry, which is to say that it would not 
be functioning in what we are assuming is the 
normal way.27
Harman expresses this claim, that a difference of qualia 
must involve a difference in function, in another way:
[T]here can be nothing one is aware of in having 
the one experience that one is not aware of in 
having the other, since the intentional content of 
an experience comprises everything one is aware 
of in having that experience.28
The critic of functionalism will no doubt find the forgoing 
unsatisfying. To assume that a difference in qualia amounts 
to or requires a difference of “perceptual representation” 
or “intentional content” in a sense that has any causal 
application. So the virtual machine state “running Firefox” 
is not now tokened by my computer. But the computational 
states and properties currently tokened by my computer 
include the hard disk memory states that store the code for 
Firefox. And it is these states (among others) that make it 
the case that, when I click on the Firefox icon, my computer 
enters into the “running Firefox” virtual machine state.23
It is worth noting that in general, some states might have 
some of their properties because their determinants 
(computational or otherwise) have the very same properties. 
Because of the relative abstractness of computational 
states, this is especially likely for virtual machine states 
and their determinants. This means that the VMF account 
of qualia can make sense of the introspection N of a not-
currently-tokened experience E, even on a perceptual 
understanding of introspection. Even if there can be 
no perception of E itself, there can be perception of the 
features f of E via perception of the same features f of the 
determinants of E, together with the fact that, say, there is 
a law that ensures that if the determinants of E have f, then 
E will have f as well.
One advantage of the “inner target” character of the VMF 
model of introspection is that it does not require, unlike 
transparency accounts such as Harman’s, an appeal to 
intentional objects to serve as the objects of experience, 
and therefore as the objects of introspection, in cases of 
imagination or hallucination. Recall that the transparent 
account understands introspection as becoming further 
acquainted with the qualities of the object of experience 
(e.g., a tree). When, as in imagination or hallucination, 
there is no physical object of experience, Harman’s 
account requires that there be an intentional object of 
the experience, and it is the features of this intentional 
object, not of any experience, which one is aware of when 
one introspects in such situations. By contrast, if the VMF 
account has any explanatory connection with intentional 
objects, it is in the reverse direction; intentional objects 
are not used by the VMF account to explain anything, but 
rather the VMF account can be seen instead as explaining 
or naturalizing purported relations to such objects (or the 
temptation to speak as such) in terms of as relations to 
physically-realizable objects: virtual machine states.
To recap this section: Harman’s revisionism is apparent in 
how he deals with a standard objection to functionalist 
accounts of qualia. Locating the problem in the notion 
that qualia are both the intrinsic features of experience 
and the objects of introspection, he dissolves the problem 
by asserting that qualia are the former and not the 
latter, implicitly asking us to revise our concept of qualia 
accordingly. He also attempts to explain why it seems 
to some (e.g., naïve qualia realists) that qualia are both. 
The VMF account of qualia, while revisionist with respect 
to other aspects of qualia, is neutral on this issue, being 
consistent with an “inner target” model in which the 
objects that introspection makes us aware of are indeed 
the intrinsic qualities of experience—properly understood.
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machine state, which assists the theorist in understanding the 
features of a cognitive architecture, including the properties 
of its experiential states. One needs also to consider what 
we call architecture-driven concepts, which are concepts the 
architect makes available to the subject that the architecture 
is an architecture of.31 The architecture-driven concepts with 
which we are concerned here (the ones that will explain 
why qualia seem to be private and ineffable) are created 
within an architecture as part of the individual history of the 
architecture or machine. Now, suppose that agent A with a 
meta-management system uses a self-organizing process 
to develop architecture-driven concepts for categorizing 
(properties of) its own internal virtual machine states as 
sensed by internal monitors. If such a concept C is applied 
by A to one of its internal states (or one or more of its 
properties), then the only way C can have meaning for A is in 
relation to the set of concepts of which it is a member, which 
in turn derives only from the history of the self-organizing 
process in A. These concepts have what Campbell refers to 
as “causal indexicality.”32
The implication of this is that A’s qualia, as experienced/
represented by A, are not the kind of thing which could be 
in a system other than A. If two agents A and B have each 
developed concepts in this way, then if A uses its concept 
Ca, to think the thought “I am having experience that is Ca,” 
and B uses its concept Cb, to think the thought “I am having 
experience Cb,” the two thoughts are intrinsically private 
and ineffable, even if A and B actually have exactly the 
same architecture and have had identical histories leading 
to the formation of structurally identical sets of concepts. 
A can wonder: “Does B have an experience described by 
a concept related to B as my concept Ca is related to me?” 
But A cannot wonder “Does B have experiences of type 
Ca?” for it makes no sense for the concept Ca to be applied 
outside the context for which it was developed, namely 
one in which A’s internal sensors classify internal states. 
They cannot classify states of B. This privacy and ineffability 
of Ca it will likely make it seem to A that its experiences 
have properties (that is, the qualia represented by concept 
Ca) that are private and ineffable.
To reiterate, when different agents use architecture-driven 
concepts, that are produced by self-organizing classifiers, 
to classify internal states of a virtual machine, and are not 
even partly explicitly defined in relation to some underlying 
causes (e.g., external objects or a presumed architecture 
producing the sensed states), then there is nothing to 
give those concepts any user-independent content in the 
way that our color words have user-independent content 
because they refer to properties of physical objects in a 
common environment. Thus self-referential architecture- 
driven concepts used by different individuals are strictly 
non-comparable: not only can you not know whether your 
concepts are the same as mine, the question is incoherent. 
If we use the word “qualia” to refer to the (properties of) 
virtual machine states or entities to which these concepts 
are applied, then asking whether the qualia in two 
experiencers are the same would then be analogous to 
asking whether two spatial locations in different frames 
of reference are the same, when the frames are moving 
relative to each other. But it is hard to convince some 
people that this makes no sense, because the question is 
relevance is to beg the question. In terms of the first 
passage just quoted, the critic of functionalism will insist 
that Harman needs to address the case in which the beliefs 
are the same and the perceptual representations are 
(functionally) the same, yet the qualia are different. Harman 
retorts that it is only someone who assumes that we are 
immediately and directly aware of the intrinsic features 
of experience who can plausibly imagine qualia floating 
free of perceptual representations and intentional content 
in this way. And to his lights he has already discredited 
that assumption (see section 2.2.1)—although we tried to 
sketch an alternative to his view.
The forgoing may or may not be a valid and/or novel 
criticism of Harman’s position; whether it is any of those is 
subsidiary to the main purpose here, which is to compare 
and contrast Harman’s account of qualia with the VMF 
account. Since we sketched a way that one might defend 
the “inner target” view of introspection, and since Harman 
diagnoses that view as being what enables a view of qualia 
that completely floats free of function, representation and 
intentional content, is the VMF account not in trouble? No—
the “inner target” view of introspection might be necessary 
for naïve qualia realism, but it does not imply it, as we 
hopefully demonstrated in 2.2.1.
More important for a comparison of the VMF account and 
Harman on this issue is not the success or failure of his 
response to the inverted spectrum challenge, but that 
he accepts that it is a valid, well-posed challenge at all. 
Such acceptance is in stark contrast to the VMF account, 
which has the implication that, at least in the case of some 
qualia, it is incoherent to wonder if a quale in one individual 
may or may not be the very same quale as that in another 
individual. To assume at the outset that it makes sense, for 
any given quale, to compare it to a quale in another subject 
is to risk making a category mistake.
This might seem an odd claim to make. The VMF account 
identifies qualia with (properties of) virtual machine states, 
which are themselves public, objectively observable 
phenomena, so why can’t their properties be compared 
or identified? Can’t we ask (and answer) the question 
of whether two computers (say) are in the same virtual 
machine state? Things get notoriously problematic when 
comparing the functional states of non-functionally 
identical systems, but what about the functionally identical 
case? Surely when two systems are functionally identical, 
the question of whether or not they are in the same virtual 
machine state (and therefore have the same qualia) has a 
clear, positive answer?
Well, yes and no (a common revisionist response!). Yes, in 
that qualia are actually properties of objective, publically 
observable virtual machine states, they are comparable, can 
be re-instantiated, etc. They are not private or ineffable.29 
But this is not engaging with the critics of functionalism on 
their own terms, saying only this is unlikely to persuade a 
non-revisionist.30
To translate what the naïve qualia realist is concerned with 
into the VMF framework, one needs to consider not (just) 
architecture-based concepts, such as that of a virtual 
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system as one’s own. Second, one must have in 
that system something with the same or similar 
functional properties as the given experience. To 
understand what it is like for the other creature 
to have that experience is to understand which 
possible experience of one’s own is its translation. 
If the latter condition is not satisfied, there will be 
no way for one to understand what it is like to have 
the experience in question. There will be no way to 
do it unless one is somehow able to expand one’s 
own conceptual and experiential resources so that 
one will be able to have something corresponding 
to the other’s experience.37
Recall that on the VMF account, there are some ways of 
thinking of (some) qualia that are, because of their history 
and causal indexicality, inherently private, non-shareable, 
and system specific. The implications of this are problematic 
for Harman’s position as stated above. Let’s assume that 
a subject A knows what it is like to be A, to have the 
experience A is now having. This knowledge, Harman would 
agree, consists in having the right conceptual resources 
to represent that knowledge. Whether B can know what it 
is like to experience what A is experiencing depends on 
what is to count as a proper “translation” of the concepts 
A is using. One could merely require the concepts to have 
similar functional profiles, which would yield Harman’s 
position: B can understand subjectively what it is like to 
be A if B is functionally similar enough to A. But this will 
not impress the naïve qualia realist, who would maintain 
that sameness of functional role (even of concepts) is 
not enough to capture qualia (because we can imagine 
them coming apart). So to explain qualia in a sense that 
is at least continuous with the way the naïve qualia realist 
thinks of them requires a stronger notion of “translation.” 
The VMF account can agree with naïve qualia realist on this 
at least: systems that are exactly functionally similar may 
nevertheless differ in some of their qualia concepts. Both 
views acknowledge a stronger sense of “translation,” in 
which one thought is the translation of another only if it 
shares the very same concepts. In this sense, no one can 
know what it is like to be anyone else; only A can know 
what it is like to be A. The advantage of the VMF account 
is that it is able to explain this view of qualia with entirely 
functionalist, physicalist resources.
2.2.3 DO QUALIA EXIST?
Both the VMF account and Harman’s account of qualia reject 
naïve qualia realism on the one hand, and eliminativism on 
the other. That is, both accounts of qualia are revisionist, at 
least in the sense of accepting NP and yet refusing to accept 
NE (see section 1). That is, they do not start by granting that 
qualia have the properties standardly believed to be had by 
them, and then explaining these properties in functionalist 
terms.
Further, as we have defined the term at the outset, Harman’s 
account is solidly revisionist in asserting that qualia exist. 
But as has been hinted a few times above, the VMF account 
is more circumspect. Given its empirical flavor, it must be.
To understand why, it might be useful to see what goes 
wrong when one tries to derive an a priori commitment 
grammatically well-formed. Sometimes real nonsense is 
not obvious nonsense. 
So the naïve qualia realists win the battle: (some) thoughts 
about qualia are intrinsically private and ineffable. But they 
lose the war: qualia themselves are not intrinsically private 
and ineffable, only some ways of thinking of them are—the 
ways that are afforded by causally indexical, architecture-
driven concepts of a particular sort.
Not everyone will be happy with our position here. For 
example, contrast our view with what Pete Mandik says 
in this passage criticizing Lycan’s indexical response33 to 
Jackson’s Knowledge Argument:34
One such problem with the indexical response is 
that it mistakenly makes numerical differences 
sufficient for subjective differences. To see why 
this is a bad thing, consider the following. Suppose 
that while Mary does not know what it is like to see 
red, Cheri, Mary’s color-sighted colleague, does 
know what it is like to see red. Upon seeing red for 
the first time, not only does Mary learn what it is 
like to see red, she learns what it is like to be Cheri. 
If Mary and Cheri were physical and experiential 
doppelgangers (though numerically distinct 
individuals) they could each know what it is like to 
be the other person, regardless of whether their 
numerical non-identity entails divergence of the 
contents of their indexical thoughts.35
If what we are saying is correct, there is a sense in which 
Mary does not learn what it is like to be Cheri. On our view, 
even physical doppelgangers do not know, in this sense, 
what it is like to be their fellow doppelganger. Worse, in 
this sense, the notion of “experiential doppelgangers” 
is incoherent. Whether this point could be turned into 
a defence of the indexical response to the knowledge 
argument is a possibility we will have to consider on 
another occasion.
Harman acknowledges an explanatory gap “between some 
aspect of our conscious mental life and any imaginable 
objective physical explanation of that aspect.”36 But he 
rejects that this explanatory gap implies a metaphysical 
one, instead locating it in the difference between objective 
and subjective understanding. A functional account of what 
goes on when someone has an experience is an objective 
account and, Harman argues, cannot in itself provide 
understanding of what it is like to have that experience, 
which requires subjective understanding. In particular, one 
must be functionally similar enough to the subject one is 
trying to understand:
Suppose we have a completely objective account 
of translation from the possible experiences of one 
creature to those of another, an account in terms 
of objective functional relations, for example. That 
can be used in order to discover what it is like 
for another creature to have a certain objectively 
described experience given the satisfaction of two 
analogous requirements. First, one must be able 
to identify one objectively described conceptual 
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The inclusion of the words we have emphasized (“Whether 
or not qualia should be taken to exist from a philosopher’s 
point of view” and “independently of whether qualia actually 
exist”) makes O’Regan, to our lights, the same kind of 
agnostic revisionist that we are. One difference, however, is 
that we suspect that our account will only be fully explanatory 
when it reaches a certain depth of detail, and that at that 
point it will likely be possible to tell whether the properties 
of the relevant virtual machine states (if any!) are sufficiently 
unified to count as referents of “qualia.” So we are not now, 
nor are we likely to ever be, in a position where we can say, 
“Here’s an explanation of qualia, but we don’t know if they 
exist.” On the contrary, we have explained in outline how it is 
possible for them to exist and to play important roles in both 
scientific explanations and engineering designs.
In closing, we can’t resist pointing out a twist that might 
present itself in the case in which our key claim is true, but 
our key hypothesis turns out to be false.  That is, if we are 
right that properties of virtual machine components of the 
appropriate, unified sort are well suited to be the referent 
of “qualia,” but we are wrong that there are such unified, 
suitable virtual machine components in humans (or other 
organisms), we could nevertheless imagine constructing 
an artificial agent which acquired—through evolution, 
learning, or design—the required unified virtual machine 
components. If, as we claim, such properties would 
likely lead such agents to develop and use the kinds of 
concepts we discuss above, then we might find ourselves 
in the awkward situation where humans do not, and yet 
robots do, have qualia! If the robots were philosophically 
sophisticated enough, some of them might even embrace 
doubly incorrect views of the situation, claiming that they 
lacked the qualia of their human forerunners because they 
were not biological, or because they could be completely 
understood in functionalist terms.
NOTES
1. Although the second author played a leading role in developing 
the original virtual machine functionalism account of qualia in 
Sloman and Chrisley, “Virtual Machines and Consciousness,” 
the current paper is mainly the work of the first author. An 
unpublished document developing some of these ideas and 
comparing them with closely related work by Maley and Piccinini 
(“Get the Latest Upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1.”) is available at 
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/vm-
functionalism.html
2. Smith, The Problem of Perception; emphasis added.
3. Crane and French, “The Problem of Perception”; emphasis 
added. On the other hand, we ourselves can only accept these 
definitions as they stand if virtual machine states are counted 
as “physical” and “ordinary” objects, a contentious view that 
we do not wish to defend here. A better move for our purposes 
would be to generalize the definitions: Illusion is any (including 
interoceptive) perceptual situation in which an object is actually 
perceived, but in which that object perceptually appears other 
than it really is; hallucination is an experience which seems 
exactly like a veridical (possibly interoceptive) perception of an 
object but where there is no such object there to be perceived.”
4. Frankish, “Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness,” 1; emphasis 
in original.
5. Noë, “Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?”
6. Pereboom, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, 3. As 
Pereboom’s position has only recently come to our attention, we 
have not yet had a chance to analyze his insights in this area; we 
hope to do so on a future occasion.
to the existence of qualia from the VMF proposal. “On the 
VMF account,” one might think, “the term ‘qualia’ refers to 
whatever happens to cause people to use that term. So it 
can’t fail to refer, even if the referent is quite other than 
what people might think it to be. So qualia must exist.”
Someone could be forgiven for understanding our proposal 
in this way, since our statement of what “qualia” refers 
to is so quick and simple. But, in fact, leaving things this 
way would place the bar too low for referential success. 
Presumably, on this simple view, “phlogiston,” “witches,” 
and “mermaids” also would refer to whatever happens 
to cause people to use those terms, and so phlogiston, 
witches, and mermaids exist, albeit in a revisionist sense38 of 
the functionalist’s attempt to save propositional attitudes). 
We do not wish to trivialize the revisionist position by 
adopting this simple view. Instead, we acknowledge that 
it is a substantive, empirical matter whether out of the 
possible myriad causes of “qualia” talk there is anything 
sufficiently unified to serve as the referent of that term (as 
there is not for “phlogiston,” “witches,” and “mermaids”).39 
Further, it is not just the causes of qualia talk that play 
a role here, but also qualia thought, at least of the kind 
where one intends to employ the same concept in thought 
as one expresses with the word “qualia.” A key claim of 
the VMF approach is that virtual machine states of a certain 
kind have properties that would suffice as the referents of 
“qualia.” A key hypothesis of the VMF approach is that there 
are, in fact, such states in humans and some animals. But it 
is part of the VMF approach that we might discover through 
empirical investigation that that key hypothesis is false. 
Our physicalist inclinations would then, in the absence of 
any other acceptable account of how “qualia” could refer, 
push us from illusionism to hallucinationism. But such 
eliminativism will incur the extra demand of having to 
explain not only why it seemed that there were things that 
were ineffable, things that were intrinsic, things that were 
private, and things that were immediate, but also why all 
these seemed to be the same thing.
Compare Kevin O’Regan, who writes the following in a 
piece entitled “Explaining what people say about sensory 
qualia”:
Independent of [the debate concerning the 
existence of qualia] there are things people usually 
say about their sensory experiences that relate to 
the notion of qualia. People say that they cannot 
completely describe the “raw”, basic, ultimate 
aspects of their sensations (e.g., the redness of 
red) to others (this is usually termed “ineffability”). 
They say that even if they cannot describe these 
aspects, they can be compared and contrasted (I 
shall say they have “structure”). And people say 
that there is “something it’s like” to have these 
raw sensory experiences (they have “sensory 
presence”). Whether or not qualia should be taken 
to exist from a philosopher’s point of view, these 
three things that people say about their sensory 
experiences need to be explained. In this chapter 
I show how . . . we can understand what we might 
mean when we say these things, independently of 
whether qualia actually exist.40
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32. Campbell, Past, Space, and Self, 43.
33. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience.
34. Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia.”
35. Mandik, “Mental Representation and the Subjectivity of 
Consciousness,” 185.
36. Harman, “Explaining an Explanatory Gap,” 2.
37. Ibid., 3.
38. Compare the criticism in Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism 
and the Propositional Attitudes,” 81.
39. See Cussins, “Nonconceptual Content and the Elimination of 
Misconceived Composites!” for one account of what “sufficiently 
unified” might amount to.
40. O’Regan, “Explaining What People Say about Sensory Qualia,” 
31–32.
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION
Nature seems here eternally to impose a singular condition, 
that the more one gains in intelligence the more one loses 
in instinct. Does this bring gain or loss?
– Julian Offray de La Mettrie1
The following paper is the first of three. It sets out the 
case for research in artificial consciousness, arguing that 
studies in artificial systems are a necessary complement 
to research into biological systems due both to the nature 
of artificial systems as well as the limitations inherent in 
studies of biological systems. First, it briefly introduces 
Piotr Boltuc’s “naturalistic non-reductionist” account of 
consciousness which holds that “first person consciousness 
is not reducible to material phenomena, but that it is at the 
same time fully explainable by such phenomena.”2 Then, 
the second and third sections of this paper explore some of 
the implications of studies into biological consciousness, 
one of which being that the “pure” subjectivity that is the 
object of some philosophical discourse is quickly occluded 
by concomitant processes and overlapping networks. 
Through the discussion, Boltuc’s originally clear assay gives 
rise to two more complex types of consciousness, most-
consciousness and myth-consciousness, both apparently 
necessary and not accidental aspects of human cognitive 
agency. We find a complimentary account in recent work 
from Thomas Fuchs, and here are met with practical limits to 
consciousness research in biological systems. In the third 
section, we follow Edelman and Baars in looking directly at 
research into artificial consciousness as a way past these 
limitations. Finally, the fourth section quickly reviews a 
series of experiments establishing the emergence of a 
minimal self-consciousness in lead up to the second paper 
in this series, which reviews this group’s most recent work 
on freewill. 
Concerning artificial consciousness, Boltuc has issued a 
positive thesis. He is confident that artificial consciousness 
is possible when the material nature of biological cognition 
is better understood. “Machines can be conscious like any 
organism can.”3 He offers an analysis of consciousness into 
three forms, functional, phenomenal and h-consciousness 
(“hard”), and he raises questions about a locus of 
consciousness based on existing biological systems.
On Boltuc’s estimation, robots are already what he calls 
“functionally” conscious. Through their normal function, 
“they can perform many thinking tasks comparable, or 
superior, to humans, though by other means.”4 “Thinking” 
for Boltuc is simple enough, being “any kind of information 
processing that increases inductive probability of arriving 
at a correct result”5—i.e., error correction. So, thinking is 
integral to learning. Phenomenal consciousness is more 
complex, and at the center of what Boltuc takes to be “the 
most important, but somewhat neglected, philosophical 
issue in machine consciousness today”, that “every 
function attributed to p-consciousness could, in principle, 
be played by an AI mechanism using some sort of 
functional mechanism, only.”6 That this is not yet the case 
is due specifically to the lack of an adequate “generator of 
consciousness” the functions of which, once understood 
adequately, will be able to be engineered.7
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ABSTRACT
Direct neurological and especially imaging-driven 
investigations into the structures essential to naturally 
occurring cognitive systems in their development and 
operation have motivated broadening interest in the 
potential for artificial consciousness modeled on these 
systems. This first paper in a series of three begins with 
a brief review of Boltuc’s (2009) “brain-based” thesis on 
the prospect of artificial consciousness, focusing on his 
formulation of h-consciousness. We then explore some 
of the implications of brain research on the structure of 
consciousness, finding limitations in biological approaches 
to the study of consciousness. Looking past these 
limitations, we introduce research in artificial consciousness 
designed to test for the emergence of consciousness, a 
phenomenon beyond the purview of the study of existing 
biological systems. 
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There are some immediate problems with such a proposal. 
For one thing, success is effectively impossible to 
confirm due to the fact that the “verification of results” is 
confounded given the privileged access that characterizes 
h-consciousness as the “mineness” of experience. The 
work now is to account for this mineness in the most direct 
way. Consider Michel Bitbol’s view.17 On Bitbol’s estimation, 
subjectivity is not something extra, it is essential to 
cognition, for consciousness, yet so is objectivity and the 
result is a necessary “dance” between first and third person 
perspectives in the representation of consciousness 
as a “stabilized and intersubjectively shared structural 
residue.”18 Problems with privileged access to subjective 
states and the problem of other minds remain imperfectly 
resolved, but this is the nature of conscious systems and to 
be expected. Such is not the nature of artificial conscious 
systems, however, and from them we may form different 
expectations.
The hurdle of privileged access may be overcome with 
perfect information about the dynamic structure of a 
cognitive system ready at hand, a perspective not afforded 
human observers of natural cognitive systems in situ such 
as those which are Bitbol’s and Boltuc’s main concern. This 
potential is afforded, however, by artificial systems as we 
shall see in greater detail going forward. First, we must 
further establish the limits of the use of biological models 
in the search for a formal structure of consciousness.
SECTION 2: TEMPORALITY
At issue is the potential for conscious machines, 
specifically artificial systems with a sense of ownership 
over their actions and intended ends. Piotr Boltuc has 
advised that research on the hard problem of engineering 
artificial consciousness should focus on the structure of 
“existing systems” in order to understand consciousness 
as it may be made to exist in non-human artificial agents, 
specifically through engineering “projectors of first-
person awareness.”19 Consider this fact in approaching the 
problem of consciousness as posed in Chalmers’ zombie 
thought experiment.20 A focus on structural isomorphism 
doesn’t seem very promising in solving the hard problem 
of consciousness in zombies, as these are structurally 
identical with existing conscious systems. On the form of 
Chalmers’ thought experiment, consciousness must be 
something other than structural isomorphism at the finest 
grain of material assay.
Chalmers’ zombies help to spotlight the fact that with 
every reduction of consciousness into material nature 
there remains the question, what is missing in a zombie 
equivalent. This is the “hard” problem of consciousness. 
There are different ways of trying to zero out the debt that 
remains on the “full” explanation of consciousness in purely 
material terms.21 One may confess to being a zombie. 
One may posit the existence of a locus of the feeling of 
mineness of consciousness, typically some organelle and 
corresponding operations within a biological brain without 
which consciousness in whatever form is impossible, 
which is the general direction recommended on Boltuc’s 
thesis as well.22 Some lines of inquiry isolate consciousness 
to networks of activity at the center of which is a hub of 
activity in the thalamus, with ongoing work in the structure 
Boltuc analyzes p-consciousness into subcategories, the 
“broad” also “functional” sense indicative of “first-person 
functional consciousness” including direct perception, and 
the “narrow” “non-functional” sense indicative of the “mine-
ness” that characterizes human-like “hard” “h-consciousness”. 
H-consciousness is the focus of Boltuc’s engineering thesis8 
because it represents the “awareness” of being, “the locus 
of first-person experiences”, and he argues that without this 
awareness “there is nothing that it is like to be that robot.”9 
Important to Boltuc’s analysis here is his distinction between 
subject and object. A subject is ultimately a non-object, and 
an object a non-subject. For Boltuc, this constitutes the 
simplest ontology, and helps to further clarify the special 
nature of h-consciousness. One way to understand the first-
person perspective is as that “subjective perspective from 
which one performs a certain function (e.g., the perspective 
from which one makes a picture)” but another way is “the 
very stream of awareness that a conscious individual has.”10 
One is “inside” and the other, the former, remains a third-
person perspective on the first-person perspective. For 
Boltuc, this distinction underscores the difference between 
a proto-cognitive system like a camera, or a robot with 
some minimal degree of “consciousness”, and the different 
case that is h-consciousness. He labels it the “Is anybody 
home?” problem essential to “systems with their own locus 
of awareness.”11
The “is anybody home” problem has to do with feeling the 
difference between before and after states consequent on 
thinking actions, as an agent experiences and necessarily 
(perhaps permanently) embodies what at least seems to 
follow from conscious phenomena. Being able to answer 
the “Is anybody home?” question is the reason that 
h-consciousness is “at least a condition of one’s status as 
a moral patient strictly understood.”12 And, given also “a 
strong, plausible tendency to view moral value as dependent 
on first person awareness (h-consciousness)”, the ability to 
answer this question carries “strong implications for ethics 
and in particular for the relative moral standing of robots, 
as they are now, and animals (including humans).”13 After 
all, Boltuc is not ready to afford moral status to entities 
simply because they are h-conscious, e.g., “rats.”14 More 
seems to be needed, and we will begin to look into what 
this more might amount to in the next section.
Finally, Boltuc argues that an artificial consciousness is 
unlikely to emerge as an aspect of a computer “program”. 
On his assay, a program can model complex biological 
systems, but that “they are not those systems” and 
therefore “it is very unlikely that h-consciousness is merely 
a feature of a program.”15 His advice is to pursue inquiries 
into biological systems first, understand for example what 
differentiates human cognition from that of a rat, and from 
this end “try to build a generator of consciousness in some 
other, inorganic or organic, matter or, if possible, find 
them in some already existing systems” i.e., as “generated 
in human and other animal brains.”16 And, this is where 
we are left, with the challenge to both conceive of how 
h-consciousness can be fully explained in material terms 
through an understanding first of how h-consciousness is 
“generated” in available biological systems and then, with 
this understanding, to “engineer” it. This is Boltuc’s non-
reductive naturalistic thesis.
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may say that this future is essentially social with deep 
moral implications for a biologically realistic account 
of h-consciousness, as well. The vmPFC is implicated 
in “empathic decision making” which involves making 
decisions in order to optimize another’s future well-
being.31 Accordingly, vmPFC damage has been associated 
with impaired moral emotions such as empathy central 
to morality and implicated in moral judgment.32 The right 
vmPFC especially is implicated in empathy, with damage to 
this area resulting in, among other things, reduced moral 
sensitivity to situations involving perceived injustice.33 The 
central thesis here is that evolved biological drives result in 
“moral emotions” that in the vmPFC automatically conjoin 
self and other interests in constraining possible futures 
towards which cognitive agency is then exercised. The 
result is the creation of joint attention and “intersubjective 
space” as the default form of future into which a self is 
projected in part through vmPFC processes (and echoing 
Bitbol in an interesting way). Taken as a whole, this research 
affords insight into the essentially social nature of human 
cognition due the essential social nature of the generation 
of the possible future self through activity in the vmPFC 
in particular.34 Human cognitive agency is social agency, 
simply put.35
Here, we find a locus of activity contributing to the 
mineness of h-consciousness that is at the same time 
essentially social and also temporal, outstripping Boltuc’s 
original analysis of h-consciousness as pure subjectivity. 
And as we explore the implications of this activity, the 
original analytic sense of zombie has also mutated into 
something more, something closer to actual human 
beings, perhaps moral zombies instead. After all, Boltuc 
intends merely that h-consciousness is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for being a moral patient, as a “locus 
of awareness” characteristic of first-person experience. Yet, 
the mineness characteristic of h-consciousness as we have 
been developing it, in consideration of neural processes 
and how these are bundled, reveals the essentially social 
and temporal dimensions of what we may call “most-
consciousness” (mine other self temporal) instead of 
merely h-conscious in order to differentiate from Boltuc’s 
analysis.
vmPFC processing makes it a prime candidate as a locus 
of most-consciousness for an essentially social cognitive 
agent, perhaps especially when integrated with the dmPFC 
into the entire mPFC.36 After all, if anything were more 
characteristic of the “mineness” of experience than the 
surprising adjustment to erstwhile hidden preferences 
and redirection of one’s future project self, it may be the 
empathy opened to others, directly allowing one’s self and 
its projected future to be emotionally transformed through 
moral perspective taking. With this in mind, then, an easy 
answer to “What is the most-zombie missing?” is “a future” 
or perhaps “a future with friends in it” or perhaps just as well, 
a vmPFC. Finally, if we accept as essential the relationship 
between a project future central to mineness and moral 
agency exercised toward this internally constructed end 
then it stands to reason that one way to engineer a zombie 
without a sense of ownership of its own agency is to 
somehow interfere with the function of the thalamus, or 
with the vmPFC, to take its present, or its future, or both.37
internal to the thalamus and how this anatomy correlates 
with consciousness.23 This is not a unique view; it is not 
unpopular and not new given the longstanding recognition 
of the thalamus as a special hub of neural activity central to 
consciousness.24
However, if we are to look at isolating a distinct region 
of central neural activity as the locus of h-consciousness 
in particular, then the thalamus may not be the best 
candidate area. After all, Boltuc’s engineering thesis 
merely advises that any effort at artificial consciousness 
should aim to recapitulate something performing as a 
“projector” or “generator” of consciousness, and this role 
might be played by a number of candidate systems. One 
possibility is the reticular activating system, for example. 
The reticular formation sits at the confluence of the internal 
environment of the central neural system above it and the 
external perceptual reality as mediated by the body system 
below. And, its role in the “projection” of consciousness is 
well-known, for example as set out by Parvisi and Damasio 
who argue that consciousness arises when an organism is 
able to “internally construct and internally exhibit a specific 
kind of wordless knowledge” that “the organism has been 
changed by an object … along with the salient enhancement 
of the object image caused by attention being allocated to 
it.”25 Consciousness then arises as the agent adjusts to the 
experience, a process enabled by the reticular formation 
and carried forward by the reticular activating system.26
That said, many regions above the reticular formation 
seem to be even more important to the sense of 
“mineness” characterizing h-consciousness in particular. 
When searching for the locus of the feeling of what it is 
to be “me” rather than another subject, consider the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex which—as Bechara, Damasio 
and Damasio describe27—“links” particular perceptions 
with established emotional valences. Moreover, these 
associations are then modulated, especially reinforced 
post-choice in the reduction of internal inconsistencies 
(“cognitive dissonance”) and without awareness.28 Folded 
into the discussion thus far, it is difficult to imagine what 
could be more “mine” than the surprising feeling of an 
unexpected adjustment to a disposition to act. And yet, the 
vmPFC is involved in processing specific to other essential 
ingredients of the mineness of experience, as well.
If anything were more mine than the felt update on 
prior embodied yet hidden preferences, then it may be 
one’s anticipations of a personal future. Damage to the 
ventromedial region correlates with the inability to take 
up anticipatory emotional states as evidenced by skin 
conductance on the presentation of a decision situation, 
with subjects optimizing for short rather than long term 
rewards, “oblivious to the future.”29 Other research has 
demonstrated that reduction in activity of the vmPFC 
correlates with reduced predictive capacity due to the fact 
that the vmPFC enacts processes that effectively populate 
possible futures from the first-person perspective such that 
a failure in predictive capacity ultimately derives from the 
“failure to think self-referentially about our future selves.”30
In short, due to activity in the vmPFC, we may say that a 
human cognitive agent “has a future”, and moreover we 
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and moderated by past conditions which are absent, on 
this rather soft zombie example.43 Without this before and 
after, we are left with a mindless doppleganger due an 
alcohol blackout, a being with most-conscious potential 
but without the memory that partly constitutes the sense of 
self about which most-consciousness is concerned.
Even this construct does not help us to solve the hard problem 
as originally formulated in Chalmers (1996) because at the 
finest grains of analysis it is not structurally identical with 
a non-zombie. Due to the presence or absence of ions and 
other neurotransmitters, molecular conformations change. 
Potentials for development change. Futures change, and 
even disappear. But, that doesn’t mean that we can’t get 
clearer on the relationship between consciousness and 
memory by holding the alcohol blackout alongside the 
zombie model. To be a zombie requires that the subject 
first have the potential for most-consciousness, and then to 
be denied its realization. The question is after all in the form 
of a “What is missing?” And, memory certainly qualifies as 
a natural non-reductionist candidate, fully explainable but 
not fully reducible to material description, after all being 
dependent on context and interpreted for others including 
one’s self in reflective inner discourse. At the same time, 
there is a strong association between memory and moral 
agency as illustrated in the fact that human beings may 
be exempted from misdeeds performed during blackout 
states that would otherwise invite greater sanction.44
The flip-side of the problem of other minds is the issue of 
accounting for one’s own. How much must be accounted 
for, and what is the best way to do it? How much memory 
does a cognitive agent need in order to be conscious in a 
morally relevant way, not be snuffed out as a nuisance? More 
than a rat? What kinds of memories are necessary? What 
kind of future is necessary? And, if these are all necessary, 
then isn’t the hippocampus also necessary along with the 
ventromedial and the thalamus? Where with a biological 
model of consciousness must we stop for an adequate 
account of consciousness? With the brain of the agent? Its 
skin? The systems in terms of which it is embedded?
Here, especially, we can see the role for symbolic expression 
in the construction of narratives that make conscious 
exposition possible. Symbols help us to remember. And 
they also help us to project. From ink and paper to the 
printing press, the first popular fictions were psychological 
self-reports.45 With these narratives as subjective, first-
person anticipatory and regretful accounts of life from the 
inside-out so to speak, there is the modern sense that what 
is important is not determined and the past perhaps best left 
behind, with the future open and at least potentially within 
control, the modern project which so given represents 
simply a ubiquitous aspiration intersubjectively distilled.46 
We will have something to say, in the third paper, about the 
motivational potential arising as horizons of anticipation 
are projected due normal adolescent neural development.
In the end, if articulating artificial consciousness means 
simulating all of this complexity in a computational 
medium, e.g., artificial cognitive agents which write papers 
for publication on the prospects of artificial cognition, then 
we may well have before us an impossible task.
But, what about its past? Time consciousness involves not 
only future and present, but also past. Nothing may be 
more “mine” than my own future, and how I feel about it, 
except perhaps my own past, how this brings me into the 
present and disposes38 me toward some futures rather than 
others. Without a past, one may be sensitive to changes 
without recognizing the difference between before and 
after as if on a perpetual roller coaster with no time to 
think. Likewise, we may imagine that zombies may be 
without pasts, without memories, without the mineness 
that characterizes most-consciousness.
Memory formation is thought to depend mostly on another 
area of the brain, the hippocampus, and interfering with the 
function of the hippocampus can result in something like a 
zombie. One interesting and more or less common loss of 
most-consciousness corresponds with the loss of memory 
in an alcohol blackout. The mineness of consciousness 
is lost along with the feeling of before and after. During 
blackouts, affected individuals often execute complex 
action routines including speech and the use of symbols 
within noisy and even dangerous environments while being 
left with often spotty memories which seem to indicate 
that p-consciousness was in some limited way present, but 
lost.39 Of the rest, there is no sense of mine-ness. There 
is no memory. Something here is missing, Boltuc’s “very 
stream of awareness” is interrupted, and this is what makes 
an alcohol blackout like being a zombie.40
When we think most broadly about the constituents of a 
unique self, especially about what is unique to this agent 
as opposed to any other, we might be drawn to the notion 
of memory. The vmPFC is necessary, and the thalamus, 
certainly, and all are structurally and functionally unique to 
each subject at the finest grains of analysis, but without a 
memory of how one used to feel about something, before 
that preference changed, then the “mineness” characteristic 
of most-consciousness is also impossible.41 In a way, then, 
the hippocampus seems to be a good location on which to 
focus if one were intent on the creation of most-zombies, 
i.e., beings exactly like us but without most-consciousness. 
However, it is not a difference in neural anatomy that 
makes the difference here. Rather, it is the presence of 
magnesium ions within an ion channel that modulates 
memory formation. Blackouts happen when Mg++ doesn’t 
get into the channel to block the influx of ions because 
without this plug, impaired memorization and long-term 
brain damage result.42 Thus, to the question “What is the 
zombie missing?” one may answer “Magnesium ions in 
receptor channels modulating NMDA receptor function” 
rather than name any neuroanatomical organelle.
Moreover, if we can imagine a drug which keeps these 
channels open to an influx of ions that results in the burnout 
of memory formation – perhaps permanently and reliably 
given certain selective stimuli – then we can imagine 
the purposeful creation of zombies which are potentially 
selectively incapable of consciousness of certain things 
and relations. The field of perception can be stabilized by 
unconscious processes, and so a stable subject is estimable, 
but in fact the feeling of mineness about one’s own direct 
experiences would be absent without a sense of change 
at least seemingly dependent on conscious processes 
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something over and above simple cognition is reinforced in 
the anatomy of thalamocortical loops as more connections 
develop between the thalamus and the frontal areas of the 
cortex in the direction of the thalamus than the other way 
around. And, on this more systematic view, we find that 
consciousness arises in the synchronization of distributed 
operations rather than in virtue of one class of cells within 
one sub-region of the central nervous system. That said, 
though such an account may tell us why a thalamus is 
necessary for consciousness in biological systems like 
ours, it does not tell us in what form it may be essential to 
conscious systems in general.51
Recognizing such limitations in biologically reductive 
approaches to consciousness, Edelman, Gally and Baars 
recommend that “A theory of human consciousness… 
must rest on a more global theory of how vertebrate brains 
are organized to yield function.”52 And this means exactly 
looking past the structure internal to the brain itself for the 
influences shaping central neural system organization. 
In this light, consider Thomas Fuchs’ effort at understanding 
cognitive agency as enabled deeply embodied material 
memorization, with the agent as a whole its own record, and 
this again only significant in light of an agent’s projected and 
anticipated future selves.53 This is a “more global” account 
than those reviewed so far, as it begins with autopoietical 
self-organization and identifies consciousness with 
processes set on maintaining the integrity of the organism 
in the face of disintegrative change. Fuchs sees cognitive 
agency as “integrative” embodiment, with memory 
distributed both within the brain and also in the material 
processes of the distributed body system as it internalizes 
the world in its interactions. Consciousness, thus, emerges 
in the “diachronic unity” of cognitive agency, as the agent 
sets out and feels its distance from more or less ideal 
situations with this proto-natural inclination ultimately 
shaping how brains and bodies are organized to yield 
function.
“The systemic unity of the organism thus becomes the 
precondition of the unity of self-experience”54 as the 
“diachronic unity of consciousness” is formed by “a self-
referential process in which each succeeding moment 
implies an awareness of the next-to-come and the just-
past” which results in “a pre-reflective self-awareness”55 
of the imminence of these instances as they are to be 
embodied. In accounting for this process, Fuchs stresses 
the role of self-organization of an organism individuated not 
by accident but due to its embodied nature and by way of 
which there arises the experience of “continuity of the self 
from a first-person perspective” the “pre-reflective feeling 
of sameness or a felt constancy of subjectivity” to which 
one awakens prior to any remembering or reconstruction 
of an object self.56 And, he finds the substrate of this felt 
sameness in the concept of “bodily existence” itself.
Bodily existence is characterized first of all by the 
“diachronic coherence of a basic bodily self” and this 
coherence specifies only “an abstract identity or sameness 
. . . but no qualitative identity,” i.e., it is purely formal. It 
tells us nothing of “the sort of persons that we are” and 
it is for this same reason that it is unrealistic, neglecting 
SECTION 3: MYTH-CONSCIOUSNESS
We have been sorting out how to understand biological 
models of consciousness in a way which affords a neat 
view on especially the “mineness” of consciousness which 
we have since developed from an analytic shell into a 
biologically more realistic sense of most-consciousness. 
But what is the relationship between consciousness and 
cognition generally speaking? In his exposition, Boltuc 
defines “cognition” as “interactions of a system with an 
environment” and importantly he adds a requirement, that 
this system must “involve structural retention of some pieces 
of information”. On this “somewhat zoocentric” account, 
for both biological and robotic “organisms” cognition 
can be construed without “reference to consciousness, 
as processing of sensory input and its assimilation into 
existing schemes” as the agent “gains knowledge” and 
“becomes aware” and then “uses that knowledge for 
comprehension and problem solving.”47 Cognition is 
very much like “thinking” which on Boltuc’s recipe works 
essentially to solve problems. The essential difference 
is that structural retention alone such as that involved in 
“learning” remains “short of consciousness” along with 
“sleepwalking” until “down towards simpler organisms”, 
e.g., “roaches,” questions for example about moral status 
due to consciousness become meaningless “since we 
seem to have no reason to presume consciousness apart 
from those [unconscious cognitive] processes.”48 Thus, 
Boltuc offers a definition of consciousness in relation 
to cognition – that it is a “special instance” of cognition, 
which cannot be reduced to simple cognition, yet which 
operates as an extension of embodied cognitive agency, 
the exercise of which ideally opens further opportunities 
for continued cognition, i.e., as the agent becomes aware 
of problems worth solving. 
Given that problems facing agents may arise in all modes 
of said agency, any realistic account of the “mineness” 
of consciousness is unlikely to limit itself to any single 
region or sub-process within the brain. Is it possible, then, 
that we may account for consciousness in terms of more 
distributed neural systems? Consider Edelman, Gally and 
Baars on what consciousness requires:
Consciousness consists of a stream of unified 
mental constructs that arise spontaneously from 
a material structure, the Dynamic Core in the 
brain. Consciousness is a concomitant of dynamic 
patterns of reentrant signaling within complex, 
widely dispersed, interconnected neural networks 
constituting a Global Workspace.49
“Unified” phenomena become so by the harmonic 
coordination of networks via the “Dynamic Core” on the 
thesis that consciousness arises due to cortical processes 
as they re-enter the thalamus from various regions. As 
we have seen, the thalamus is the nexus of “reentrant 
signaling” produced by the complex, widely dispersed, 
interconnected neural networks which constitute Baar’s 
(1997) “Global Workspace” some of which is engaged 
within any given task environment.50
Dynamic core models clarify a number of things. For 
example, the subjective sense that consciousness is 
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through self-directed self-change, becoming the agent 
required for the execution of some action or other the 
necessity of which arising first in the subjective projection 
of possible future self-situations of and for that very agent. 
This new form we may call “myth-consciousness.” This 
distinction between what we have been calling “most-” 
and “myth-” consciousness is worth some attention.64 The 
latter’s important role comes largely from the fact that 
cognitive agents more or less embody the vastness of 
history and its determinations.65
Myth-consciousness retains the mineness and essentially 
moral social temporal nature of most-consciousness, but 
recognizes that as embodiment is the medium of memory, 
and that as embodied memory is history, then the nature 
of (human-like) consciousness is essentially historical as 
well. From this point of view, “Pure consciousness without 
a subjective body is a dualistic abstraction which forgets 
that all thinking owes its emergence to the preceding 
process of life.”66 These life processes are the assemblage 
of continuously unfolding problem solving routines unique 
to a uniquely historically situated, uniquely materially 
embodied social cognitive agent, i.e., Boltuc’s “thinking.” 
Fuchs writes that “through our habits, we inhabit the 
world”67 with this habitation constraining focal attention, 
while also cementing the agent into the landscape of living 
history which is its focus. Thus we may stress that this is a 
circular process. The world informs (as in “puts the form 
into”) our habits, and through these habits we change the 
world that again informs our habits upon which we then 
act.
Emphasizing the historical depth of embodied memory, 
Fuchs points to the difference between traumatic and more 
everyday memories with interesting implications for our 
understanding of myth-consciousness, as well. In illustration 
of the way that trauma affects embodied memory, Fuchs 
quotes Aahron Applefield who survived as a refugee from 
Ukraine under fascism during the last World War: “The cells 
of my body apparently remember more than my mind which 
is supposed to remember.”68 And, Fuchs is right to draw 
attention to the difference in deep memory of traumatic 
versus everyday events. Jovasevic et al. have shown in a 
mouse model two pathways for memory encoding active in 
the hippocampus, one which distributes memory to higher 
level cortical regions, and another which passes traumatic 
memories to sub-cortical systems essentially outside 
the reach of conscious introspection.69 Surprisingly, the 
same GABA receptors in the hippocampus which had 
been associated with the impairment of fear-related 
memorization facilitate the retrieval of fear-related memory 
states, and they do this by promoting subcortical activity as 
opposed to distributed cortical activity typically associated 
with episodic memory. Of course this makes sense. It 
serves the survival of an agent to respond reflexively to 
dangers in the environment, with the somatic marker of fear 
or rage attaching to those biochemical changes resulting 
from pre-cortical information processing. This is the pre-
reflexive condition into which we awake, and on Fuchs’ 
account this level of embodied memory especially grounds 
personal identity. Thus, the more or less stable subject 
over time that, as a relatively regular pattern of activity that 
the fact that “all enactments of life are integrated into the 
memory of the body, and here they remain preserved as 
experiences, dispositions, inclinations and skills.”57 In 
other words, on Fuchs’ account, consciousness is always 
and already of deeply embodied material memory with this 
record also establishing implicit valuations on experience 
that are more or less malleable (e.g., in the case of an 
octopus, not so much). In so far as this embodied agency 
is furthered or hindered, healed or injured things are good 
or bad, and the body as memory is the record of this status 
quo as well as how to deal with it.58 “Body memory is thus 
the ensemble of all habits and capacities at our disposal.”59
Rather than looking for a generator of conscious phenomena, 
Fuchs finds the grounds of consciousness in the temporal 
structure of consciousness, the binding together not of 
subjective with objective points of view, but rather future 
with past and not within a self as a separable process, but 
constitutive of self (and likely demanding a “multi-layered” 
understanding of self60). Working from a Husserlian analytic, 
Fuchs writes that “the stream of experience as a continuous 
synthesis of what is not-yet, what is now, and what is no-
longer” constitutes the “diachronic unity of consciousness” 
as a “self-referential process in which each succeeding 
moment implies an awareness of the next-to-come and 
the just-past” resulting in, again, the “pre-reflective 
self-awareness”61 that is the also the target of Boltuc’s 
h-consciousness. However, it is only when coupled with 
the deep material memory of embodied cognition that this 
“pure” subjectivity takes on its unique character, mine own 
such that “without its embedding in the continuity of pre-
reflective bodily existence” the mineness of consciousness 
disappears and “the narrative self and its memories remain 
but [as] a story that we tell about an alien person.”62
It is not simply a matter of occupying a position in a course 
of historical evolution that is at issue, here. Rather, the 
capacity for the subject to employ embodied resources in 
the direction of this history is a difference that is worthy of 
distinction from the simple model of most-consciousness 
that we have developed thus far. Consider here why 
Edelman, Baars and Seth hold forth for the necessity of 
narrative facilitated by language in the exposition of the 
“mineness” characteristic of human consciousness as it 
facilitates the detachment of the subject from the feeling 
of being its self in the present.63 This same capacity allows 
human beings to represent for others similarly embodied 
the series of conformations undergone in a felt, embodied 
transformation from one situation to another, e.g., we can 
learn from others’ self-reported experience, and reflect on 
our own in the same way. On the other hand, the authors 
do not find this capacity in octopi as they appear unable 
to adapt neural structures driving goal achievement in 
recognizable response to contextual cues in a laboratory 
environment, so seemingly making any narrative progress 
beyond simple evolutionary forces impossible and any 
question about how octopi might communicate changes 
to others moot (for example, through skin color changes). 
As this case illustrates, there is a distinction to be made 
between a cognitive agent acting within the space of its 
evolution, determined by its inherited form, and a cognitive 
agent with the capacity to make this history both through 
symbolically represented narrative exposition as well as 
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SECTION 4: MINIMAL SELVES
While Boltuc cuts the cognizer into two logical aspects, 
subject and object, Edelman, Gally and Baars emphasize a 
dynamic core within a global workspace, and Fuchs finds 
the subjective and objective standpoints to be together 
essential to cognition in integrative embodied agency. 
One thing that all share is a positive assessment of the 
prospects of a properly configured artificial consciousness, 
and all generally agree on how such a machine might be 
built, replicating part or all of an organic system. Following 
such a recipe in an artificial medium faces difficulties with 
replicating processing dynamics due to biochemical reality. 
We will approach these issues in the third paper in our 
series, when we revisit Boltuc’s natural non-reductionism. 
Current technology does not afford computational power 
to simulate realistic human brain activity. However, we may 
not need to instantiate whole brains and narrative-historical 
political consciousness in chemical metabolisms with all 
attending systems due natural embodiment in order to 
isolate aspects of consciousness. Rather, specific features 
might be drawn in their essential dynamics, such that “a 
much smaller number of simulated neurons and synapses 
might prove sufficient to give rise to a particular mental 
property, such as imagery.”75
One particularly important aspect of the problem of 
consciousness as we have drawn it in discussion thus far 
is the problem of time consciousness, or “temporality”, 
and one especially interesting aspect of temporality is 
how the raw flow of perceptual experience is parsed and 
consolidated into narratives composed of sequences of 
events involving objects as well as other subject agents.76 
We will describe recent experiments involving the 
instantiation into robots of this capacity to construct and 
to deconstruct possible futures, to aim for them so as to 
explore the consequences in the next paper. Here, by way 
of introduction, we will briefly review how this research 
program demonstrates the emergence of “basic self-
awareness” in the form of a minimally self-reflective self.
Tani’s basic model employs higher and lower levels of 
differently configured neural networks with the latter 
tuned to the immediate environment and responsive to 
rapid changes while the former higher level is attuned to 
longer ranged patterns. It is in the interactions between 
these two levels that Tani finds consciousness arising, and 
he has spent the last two decades building robots which 
demonstrate this to be the case (for most complete review, 
see Tani, in press). Here, discussion should turn to the 
notion of predictive coding and its relationship with the 
diachronic unity of Tani’s neurorobots.77
In 1998, Jun Tani detailed a dynamical system structure 
accounting for the phenomenon of the momentary 
appearance of the “self” and demonstrated these dynamics 
in robotics experiments. Tani showed that the self emerges 
momentarily when the coupled dynamics between the 
internal neural network and the environment shift from 
coherent to incoherent dynamics. When everything 
proceeds as anticipated in the coherent phase, there is no 
distinction between the self and the environment in the 
coupled dynamics. However, the self can be perceived 
as separate from the environment when something goes 
“emerges . . . from a history of embodied experience which 
has accumulated and sedimented in body memory and as 
such is implicitly effective in every present moment”70 is 
more or less constituted by unconscious processes, and 
this has serious implications for any consideration of the 
“mineness” of consciousness.71
The ghost is not in the machine. The ghost is the machine. 
Troubles arise when embodied habits do not suit the 
changing environment, when embodied existence 
cements history in its “bones” and the traumatized agent 
can no longer adapt habits to a different habitat. At this 
extreme, there is no longer any ghost, only mechanism 
perhaps amounting to a kind of zombie. And here, with the 
pre-reflective capacity to adjust to environmental changes 
in the maintenance of prospective integrity, Fuchs points 
out that these “circular processes” of self regulation are 
“arguably necessary for the emergence of basic self-
awareness” within an artificial consciousness as well. An 
artificial consciousness must find itself situated in the 
world, on its way to different situations, with prospective 
self-awareness and also memory about these situations 
and the transitions between them.72
With this, Fuchs brings us to a practical limit facing 
any program in the study of biological consciousness. 
Every stage of development of an organism embodying 
Fuchs’ deep material memory—and experiencing those 
peculiarly “mine” moments, for example when a human 
being completes a paper on consciousness after years 
of conscious and unconscious preparation—cannot be 
reliably isolated in the study of a biological system. They 
may be reported, shared. But, they cannot be exactly 
reproduced. All of the dimensions weighed in the use 
of one term rather than another, for example, cannot be 
systematically tracked. This is not the case for inquiries into 
artificial conscious systems, however. Indeed, recognizing 
a similar limit to the biological approach, Edelman, Gally 
and Baars issue something of a compliment to Boltuc’s 
engineering thesis, advising that we must “accept” that 
we cannot map cognition in the study of living beings, “to 
trace causal chains at all levels of complexity in the brain 
circuits that contribute to consciousness” while at the 
same time suggesting that a “brain-based device, driven 
by a simulated brain . . . would be key to success” in 
understanding consciousness, instead.73
In summary, where Edelman, Gally and Baars recommend 
research into “brain-based” devices, and Boltuc likewise 
points to “generators” of consciousness within biological 
brains, Fuchs suggests that the prospects for artificial 
consciousness emerge at the interface of embodied 
cognitive agent and environment, at the level of whole 
organism in the social historical temporal world that is mine 
and yours in so far as we embody these horizons. So, to the 
question “What is a zombie missing?” one might answer 
“Itself” as a whole.74 In the next and final section of this 
paper we introduce a research program in neurorobotics 
which instantiates “circular processes” such as those which 
Fuchs finds requisite for basic self-awareness, leaving the 
next paper in this series to set out in detail this groups’ 
work in freewill and self-reflective consciousness. 
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The central thesis driving this work has been that 
consciousness arises in the correction and modification of 
dynamic structures potentially spontaneously generated 
in the higher-level cortical area including the pre-frontal 
cortex (PFC) in biological models. And importantly, a 
“simulated brain” has not been required to test this thesis. 
Instead, a much simpler system is able to embody its 
own possible future situations in the form of a minimal 
self, and to reconfigure this future as existing projects 
are frustrated. Tani employs the image of the sandpile, 
stable with every grain until the last when it all collapses 
to describe the condition of a dynamic system at a critical 
point. What results from the sand pile is another sandpile, 
with potential energy released that was otherwise bound 
up with its arrangement. The difference between a human 
being and a sandpile is more or less leisure, metabolism 
above background, in short a capacity to construct its own 
order through action. With the complexity of the evolved 
biological system, we may begin looking at constituent 
sub-sandpiles and their arrangements, as we had begun 
with biological systems in the first section of this paper. 
The questions that remain are merely how many one 
embodies, in what arrangement, which triggers first and in 
which contexts.81
One pressing objection to qualifying any such system as 
conscious, especially of the hard family of most- and myth-
conscious, is that artificial systems are too simple. Of course, 
simulations of cognition are necessarily less complex than 
the biological system monitoring them, as overly-complex 
simulations defeat the purpose of a simulation.82 Though it 
is true that artificial agents in a laboratory are simpler than 
organic brains out functioning in the real world, in artificial 
consciousness studies the potential exists to isolate 
essential features with a resolution otherwise lost against 
the background real-world noise and corruption of the 
biological approach. These artificial systems may be more 
conscious, completely conscious, or demonstrate pure 
consciousness in a way that a biological system cannot, 
because there are so many facets of cognitive agency 
essential to living systems that need not be replicated in 
an artificially conscious system. And, due to the nature 
of artificial systems, the hurdle that is privileged access 
to subjectivity may be overcome with perfect information 
about the dynamic structure of a cognitive system ready at 
hand. This potential does not exist in the study of biological 
systems. This potential is afforded, however, by artificial 
systems as we shall see in greater detail in the next paper 
in this series.
Artificial conscious systems afford a privileged insight into 
the structure of cognitive agency and how such systems in 
their normal operations result in the feelings of being a self 
in the world, a feeling that meets our every internal self-
reflection. These investigations are not limited to available 
biological models, and there is no risk of polluting the 
natural environment with genetically engineered creatures 
designed to represent certain modes of consciousness 
over others. That said, biological studies continue to inspire 
artificial systems. For example, Tani’s MTRNN architecture83 
was inspired by fMRI studies on higher level areas including 
the PFC showing them important to abstract reasoning and 
the integration of sensation. Research in mirror neurons 
wrong, in conflict with the system’s anticipation, in the 
incoherent phase.
In the first experiment (Tani, 1998), constructive and 
deconstructive interactions between the bottom-up 
pathway of perception and the top-down pathway of 
prediction were balanced by internal parameters derived 
from prior prediction error. Throughout the learning 
process, the entire system dynamics proceeded with 
intermittent shifting between the coherent and incoherent 
phases, with good predictability in the former and poor 
predictability in the latter. These results were interpreted 
though Heidegger’s (1996) famous example of the 
hammer, i.e., we become aware of the use of the hammer 
only when the hammer fails to perform as anticipated, such 
as when it breaks. In this case, Tani postulated that the gap 
generated between top-down anticipation and bottom-up 
reality in the incoherent period represent the difference 
between the unconscious, routine use of a hammer and 
its perhaps violent mechanical failure. In this moment, 
Tani conjectured, the structure of cognitive agency as a 
“minimal self” rises to awareness. As the agent looks for 
“What went wrong?” it takes itself as a possible object and 
answer, “I went wrong.” Further, Tani conjectured that the 
entire system dynamics tends to proceed toward a certain 
critical state in which a large range of fluctuations may take 
place, a condition analogous to a system at criticality.78
Tani and Nolfi (1999) and Tani (2003) further explored this 
problem of self-referential selves.79 Especially, in a learning 
experiment with a robot navigating a maze environment 
(Tani & Nolfi, 1999) and one with a robotic arm manipulating 
an object (Tani, 2003), the continuous sensorimotor flow 
of information became segmented into reusable behavior 
primitives. This chunking was accomplished through a 
dynamic gate opening/closing (Tani & Nolfi, 1999) or 
parametric bias shift (Tani, 2003) occurring in a step-wise 
fashion through the effort of minimizing prediction error, 
which drove the segmentation or raw perceptual flow into 
primitive sequences or chunks. After the learning process, 
the higher level network was also able to predict the 
sequences of behavior primitives in terms of shifts in this 
parametric bias vector. Tani interpreted this phenomena 
as the process of achieving a self-referential self, because 
the subjective experience of sensorimotor flow becomes 
objectified into reusable units which are manipulable by 
higher level processes, e.g., thinking. This interpretation is 
intuitive, because as the original experience of one’s own 
sensorimotor flow is reconstructed with compositional 
structures, they become consciously describable 
objects rather than merely impressions of the original 
experiences. Then, from this understanding, Tani (2009) 
found in this capacity the origins of “self-referential 
selves” as the agent sets out actionable compositions as 
neurodynamical self-constructs that “emerge … through 
self-organizing compositional mechanisms of assembling 
and de-assembling sensorimotor schemata of repeated 
experiences”, revisionary processes which arise only “in 
critical conditions of sustaining conflictive interactions 
between the top-down subjective mind and the bottom-up 
sensorimotor reality.”80
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19. Boltuc, “The Philosophical Issue in Machine Consciousness,” 171.
20. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind.
21. The first author is indebted to Alexander VonSchoenborn for 
educating him to identify these IOUs.
22. Remaining sensitive to the fact that Boltuc’s view on this point 
has developed in the meantime, the current paper attends solely 
to the position represented in his paper from 2009.
23. Cf. O’Muircheartaigh et al., “White Matter Connectivity of the 
Thalamus Delineates the Functional Architecture of Competing 
Thalamocortical Systems.”
24. Cf. Llinas et al., “The Neuronal Basis for Consciousness.” It is 
important to note that the systematicity of connected networks is 
reflected in the neural physiology of non-human animals, as well. 
See, for example, discussion in O’Muircheartaigh et al., “White 
Matter Connectivity of the Thalamus Delineates the Functional 
Architecture of Competing Thalamocortical Systems.”
25. Parvizi and Damasio, “Consciousness and the Brainstem,” 137.
26. Cf. Boltuc, “The Two Forks in the Road Towards h-consciousness,” 
in press.
27. Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio, “Emotion, Decision Making, 
and the Orbitofrontal Cortex.”
28. Cf. Coppin et al., “When Flexibility Is Stable: Implicit Long-Term 
Shaping of Olfactory Preferences.”
29. Cf. Bechara, Tranel, and Damasio, “Characterization of the 
Decision-Making Deficit of Patients with Ventromedial Prefrontal 
Cortex Lesions,” 2198.
30. Mitchell et al., “Medial Prefrontal Cortex Predicts Intertemporal 
Choice,” 6.
31. Cf. Janowski, Camerer, and Rangel “Empathic Choice Involves 
vmPFC Value Signals That Are Modulated by Social Processing 
Implemented in IPL.”
32. Cf. Koenigs et al., “Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases 
Utilitarian Moral Judgements.”
33. See Mendez, “The Neurobiology of Moral Behavior: Review and 
Neuropsychiatric Implications,” for review.
34. Cf. Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious 
Brain.
35. Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, re: 
“mitda-sein.”
36. Cf. Spunt et al., “The Default Mode of Human Brain Function 
Primes the Intentional Stance.”
37. The notion of most-consciousness is much more complicated 
than Boltuc’s original h-consciousness. However, it better reflects 
the biological reality. Questions remain whether this “thickening” 
of the analytic sense of h-consciousness is a biological accident 
or essential to the dynamic structure necessary for cognitive 
agency in any form. And there is a role for analysis in answering 
these questions going forward. However, the purpose of analysis 
is to “carve the world at its joints,” rendering complex systems 
simple enough for ready manipulation, and problems arise when 
analysis takes inquiry away from the original problem and directs 
instead to entities that exist only in the context of the analysis. 
One way to spot these problems is to put the parts together and 
see if anything is left over or left out. This is the method that 
we are pursuing in this series of papers, moving from biological 
to artificial systems integrations. And that said, one dimension 
of temporal integration remains left out of this model of most-
consciousness.
38. Note that I do not write “generates within me the propositional 
attitude toward” (cf. Thagard, “Desires Are Not Propositional 
Attitudes”).
39. Fuchs (“Self Across Time: The Diachronic Unity of Bodily 
Existence”) recalls these sorts of phenomena as Leibniz’s “little 
perceptions.”
40. Note that Boltuc anticipates the form of this discussion, 
recognizing that there are in any conscious system also 
“unconscious cognitive processes” on the basis of which “one 
can ask whether an organism is conscious while still performing 
inspired the hypothesis that predictive coding might 
be essential for pairing generation and recognition of 
actions, as tested with Tani’s RNNPB.84 However, the point 
is that empirical biological results cannot access the core 
problem of consciousness, as we have tried to articulate in 
the current paper.
CONCLUSIONS: WHAT TO EXPECT
The next paper in this series details how dynamic 
complex systems embodied in neurorobots demonstrate 
consciousness in their normal operations. The third paper 
in this series will revisit Boltuc’s h-, and this paper’s most- 
and myth- consciousnesses in order to evaluate Tani and 
colleagues’ model. Are these robots h-conscious? More? 
Myth-conscious? At that point, finally we will revisit Boltuc’s 
naturalistic non-reductionist thesis, as it may not be the 
material nature of a cognitive agent which ultimately 
grounds any account of consciousness, but rather the 
dynamic structure that had traditionally only existed in 
biological, and that now is instantiated also in artificial, 
forms.
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42. Cf. White, “What Happened? Alcohol, Memory Blackouts, and the 
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44. As much as there is a “problem of access” to another 
consciousness besides one’s own, there is the reverse, an 
obligation to make one’s own inner world sensible to others 
similarly embodied. Where this is impossible, agency is judged 
differently.
45. As understood, for example, in Habermas, Communication and 
the Evolution of Society.
46. The adolescence of the West after the death of the parents and 
the mourning period of the mid-life (as if life was a brutal and 
filthy orphanage), the collective anticipation to get out of that 
situation arose in the Enlightenment.
47. Boltuc, p. 160
48. Ibid. Note correlate portrait by Watanabe and Mizunami, “Pavlov’s 
Cockroach: Classical Conditioning of Salivation in an Insect.”
49. Edelman, Gally, and Baars, “Biology of Consciousness,” 5.
50. For instance, implicating the hippocampus in Baars, Franklin, 
and Ramsoy, “Global Workspace Dynamics: Cortical ‘Binding and 
Propagation’ Enables Conscious Contents.”
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53. Fuchs, “Self Across Time.”
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when I
perceive 
an apple,
ùwhich
of these
 two things
am I?
A brain?
or the apple?
It may seem bizarre to consider two things!
two objects ... How vulgar! 
ùAfter all, aren’t minds supposed to be different from things? 
And yet, is there anything but things?
www.consciousness.it
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the most popular choice is
the brain. Yet, like the
emperor’s new clothes, 
the brain is naked! the brain 
is yet another object ... 
I mean ‘things’ because
in nature everything is 
a spatiotemporally entity 
made of matter/energy 
with a causal role,
that is ... a thing!
then, the brain, being an object, 
could have none either!
furthermore, if objects had none 
of experience’s properties
I am a physical object
I thought I was special, 
but I am not!
Oh my!!!
As a matter of fact, 
neural activity is neither like 
one’s mind nor like 
one’s world!
are physical
is physical too!
however, rather than 
throw away the brain, let’s consider 
other physical candidates!
And ... 
As regards 
the mind, the brain 
should 
come out! 
2
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so, let us get 
back to the 
original 
question! 
consider the 
simplest case
of experience
take an 
apple!
what’s
simpler 
than 
that?
look closely at 
the apple you just grabbed! 
isn’t it just like your
experience of it?
isn’t it red, 
round, and 
applish?
isn’t it just
like the
conscious
percept?
WE HAVE TWO THINGs: 
the brain (1) and 
the apple (2)! 
which of them is 
one’s experience?
Brain/BODY
OBJECT
EXPERIENCE ???
i DON’T KNOW
a priori 
WHAT 
eXPERIENCE
IS !
but ...
iF i free EXPERIENCE FROM 
THE PHiLO JARGON,
I AM LEFT WITH THE APPLE
i HAVE IN FRONT OF ME!
1 2
3
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Solution 3: OBJECTBOUND!Solution 2: BRAINBOUND
Solution 1: dualism
where am I then?
where is the experience
 of the apple? 
thus, If I contrast 
the experience 
of the apple 
with the apple, 
they are 
the same! 
on the other 
hand, brain and 
the experience 
of the apple are 
completely
different!
I can put back my brain in my skull, 
the brain is the only object I am not! 
I must be elsewhere! 
= ≠
one 
might put 
experience 
outside of 
the physical 
world. 
But it would 
be a non 
starter
or, one 
might put the mind inside 
the brain. but, the brain is 
just an object and inside
the head nothing is 
like one’s experience  
then, I am left with 
the only physical candi-
date: the object!
a mind-object identity
theory
in 
short
the idea is 
that 
one’s expe-
rience  is 
the very 
object one 
experiences!
call it 
object 
bound
here? 
in another 
dimension?
here?
? I am
the mind!!!
Object
=
experience
or, 
surprisingly,
here?
4
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MY MIND 
IS NOT HERE
the hypothesis is 
rather straightforward!
when I experience an 
object, the thing I am is 
the very object!
it is a mind-object identity 
theory!
let’s take a quantum 
leap! leave behind 
the orthodox 
brain/body-centric 
view of reality and 
embrace a new 
èstance. The 
center is 
no longer 
the body 
but the 
object! 
brain
  body
world
I am
the apple
wait a sec! 
I can’t be the apple!
I feel I am here! inside my 
head! behind my eyes and 
between my ears!
‘Ptolemaic’
brain-centered view
of the mind
‘Copernican’
object-centered view
of the mind
the new
view!
nonsense! 
one does not
 feel where the 
mind is, one feels 
where the 
body is!
More precisely, 
where sensory 
organs are. 
Dennett showed
how to debunk 
such a notion!
the old
 view!
5
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brain/body
object/mind
enviro
m
ent
dam
laketerrain
object
body
or consider a dam and its 
lake! the dam allows the 
lake to exist, yet 
the dam is not the lake!
likewise, the object we 
perceive exists because our 
body allows it to take place 
causal
process
the apple 
we perceive
is not an ideal 
apple but the 
very apple we 
grab and eat
there is
no reason 
to prefer
one side 
of the skin 
to the other.
the external 
side is as 
good as the 
internal one!
the object takes place 
because of the causal service 
the body offers
yet ... if I am the 
apple, what role 
the brain have          
?
E=O B
the brain plays 
a causal contingent role
 rather than a constitutive one! 
the object is one and the same 
with one’s experience
the object/mind is like a lamp that
turns on because of a switch.
The light is not the switch, 
but it needs it
6
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thus, we can finally overcome the 
dreaded subjective vs. objective 
gap (aka the hard problem)!
subjective
properties/
entities
objective
properties/
entities
re
lati
ve properties
mental
world
physical
world
gap?
v1
v2
v3
v4
vN
v5
in fact, it is not 
by chance that the objects we 
perceive are only those that take 
place because of our bodies!
the list of the properties of 
objects and the list of causal 
couplings between nature and 
our bodies is perfect
the so-called 
‘subjective’ properties 
are just 
relative properties, 
like velocity
for instance, consider velocity, 
is it subjective OR relative? 
Am I still?
of course,
I am STILL!
yet, i’m also
hurtling around
the sun!
in physics, a body can have as many 
relative velocities as reference 
frames. Such velocities are not 
subjective, they are realitive.
all such velocities are real and 
are there in the object, no 
matter whether they are relative
likewise, some stuff can be as 
many different objects relatively 
to as many different physical sys-
tems are there
in practice, An object is 
like a key, and the brain 
is like its lock!
Actually, the
brain is more 
like a collection 
of locks
color
flavour texture
taste
locks
keys pe
rf
ec
t 
m
at
ch
es
!!
!
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to be continued?
nature is a spatiotemporal 
manifold populated of things 
with a causal role:
the body and the object. 
which one is my experience? 
the idea is really simple: 
the experience of the 
apple is the apple!
I am the object. 
my mind is where the 
object is! and not 
where the body is.
the body and the 
mind are in two 
different 
places.
CAUSAL
RELATION
object
is mind
body is
not mind
if 
the mind is 
the object, 
nature provides 
everything we need. 
Everything is a thing. 
we only have to set aside 
our parochial prejudices 
about being inside our 
bodies! 
I call this view, the 
spread mind theory.
is it really so crazy?
Thank you!
to recap, 
the thing 
that I am 
is not my 
body 
walking in 
the world
I am not my body, I am the world I 
perceive 24/7, I am there! not here!
SP
AC
E
TIME
© Riccardo Manzotti, 2016
IULM University, Milan
www.thespreadmind.com
www.consciousness.it
riccardo.manzotti@gmail.com 8
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machines correctly as well as to prepare for their possible 
reactions. For example, the so-called more intelligent AI 
program nowadays, ConceptNet system, has a higher IQ 
than a four-year-old, and it can face this kind of problem. 
It will also help us to improve the rational approach to AI 
performance and actions.6 Consequently, death awareness 
and aging are the two related phenomena that we analyze 
in this paper. Our idea is that in spite of the fact of possible 
repairs, definitive extension and maintenance of dynamic 
cognitive structures are not possible. Aging and death seem 
to be necessary for conscious beings. Besides, constant 
learning rates and open attitudes towards new ideas are not 
possible for the systems with strong beliefs and experiential 
results. Any homeostatic system tends to equilibrate the 
informational universe under its range of possible decisions 
and actions.7 Figure 1 shows qualitatively the development 
and decay of cognitive functions via maturation and 
senescence, described in detail below.
Consequently, we can define the following scenarios in 
which an AIA should be faced to aging/death problems:
1. Mechanical: bodies get older, and their parts 
become worn off. Some can be changed, but some 
others not. Brains, for example, are not transferable 
and even lesser minds lose their properties when 
transferred. Professor Warwick created a robot 
that experienced problems with biological brains 
implemented into robots: these brains need to 
adapt to the new embodiments, but at the same 
time, the brains became older and needed to 
be replaced.8 The mixture of living and artificial 
mechanisms is something that is faced with 
serious problems from the eternal life perspective. 
Even in the case of considering classic robots, due 
to their hundreds or thousands of components, 
in case of self-development and self-adaptation 
similar to a human brain, the easy transfers will 
not be possible once their compounds experience 
life-cycle influence and aging and malfunction . . . 
like the beings do.
2. Informational: At the same time, we infer that 
these intelligent creatures will be faced withto 
some important formal-architectural problems: 
first of all, the current Von Neumann architecture is 
inadequate for the reimplementation of neuronal 
structures in a computational machine. Most 
promising simulations are now done in realistic 
neural networks like NEST. The inability to simulate 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the moments that defines the life of any living 
system, with some higher cognitive skills, is the crucial 
instant during which that being becomes aware of its 
own death. There is a corollary of this idea: the inevitable 
and large physical decrepitude of the body (and mind) 
that usually is related to aging processes. Our biological 
clocks, though we could ignore them for some time, never 
stop counting our minutes of the active life. Despite the 
fact that people know about their own death, even at 
early child stages1 only sudden, accidental, traumatic and 
unexpected signals of this fact produce changes into the 
daily lives of those humans.2 Think, for example, of how 
Siddharta Gautama Buddha reacted to the awareness of the 
existence of death after being deprived of this information 
by his overprotective father. The typical midlife crisis of 
theat ‘40s and ‘50s is another example of this phenomenon. 
Psychologists have studied how humans tend to show 
attitudes towards death, trying to analyze and even quantify 
it, producing measurements like Death Anxiety Scale (DAS),1 
Fear of the Death Scale (FDS),2 or Death Concern Scale (DC).3 
And especially in those cases of survival of unexpected 
death peril (human menace, illness, natural disaster, etc.), 
humans tend to completely change their values and lives. 
Healing from trauma is commonly defined by those who 
have experienced it as a “rebirth” process. The life on earth 
and development of the societies—including literature, 
arts, and all the political apparatus—would have appeared 
dramatically different in absence of aging and death. It 
is therefore legitimate, in times of optimism regarding 
AI development, to consider how influential aging and 
death (in the sense of awareness of it) could be for the 
development of a future hybrid society where machine 
and biological intelligence can productively cooperate. 
Taking into account the cognitive mechanisms related to 
aging and death, we ask ourselves how a new generation 
of realistic Artificial Intelligence Agents (henceforth, AIA) 
could cope with their own degeneration, malfunction, and 
even final disintegration or death. In spite of of radical 
life extension programs and expectations, the truth is that 
inside of an entropic universe, the final and big death (the 
Big Freeze, Big Rip, Re-explosion, as possible hypotheses) 
are inevitable.
MAPPING THE EXISTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF 
ARTIFICIAL ADAPTIVE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS 
We review several scenarios that an AIA can find once 
monitoring its own embodiment as well as the environment 
in which it will need to operate. This way we could be able to 
design future mechanisms to control, nurture, and train these 
strong beliefs and experiential results. Any homeostatic system tends to equilibrate the 
informational universe under its range of possible decisions and actions (Maturana & Varela, 
1987; Mingers, 1994). Figure 1 shows qualitatively the development and decay of cognitive 
functions via maturation and senescence, described in detail below.  
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should not use the revolutionary steps to change, 
tending to a stabilization and lack of progress or 
paradigmatic change. Scientific revolutions are 
held by young or middle-age agents who try to 
find their place in academia and society. Therefore, 
the different kind of intelligent activities (which 
include linguistic tools, action organization, or 
epistemic methods, among others), always require 
some kind of social cooperation.12
5. Emotional: moods and emotional clues: a long-
living AI should have more time to think, but 
intrinsic limitations of our universe can depress 
it: Big Freeze, loss of energy by entropy, stars 
consumed, galaxies’ constant expansion until the 
context of an universe absolutely black (no star 
lights able to cross the whole universe distance, so 
no possibility of reaching any new place). It would 
imply the certainty of a death eventually and 
possibly lack of sense, modifying their mood and 
behavior. At the same time, we need to consider 
the instabilities that such emotional architectures 
would imply for the behavior and goal definitions 
for older AI systems.
6. Moral: we are now facing that an AIA will need to 
deal directly with moral decisions over death and 
life: intelligent cars, medicine decisions, military 
robots, etc. This has a strong relationship with 
the fact: elderly populations tend to be more 
conservative in their decisions.13 For the same 
opposite cognitive (and hormonal) reasons, young 
people are impetuous, brave, prone to risky or 
unknown activities. This is not only related to 
biochemical aspects of the body, but also to the 
knowledge acquisition as well as the necessity 
of generating stable conceptual frameworks and 
optimizing life expectancy. Consequently, these 
aged AIA would tend to defend conservative moral 
aspects instead of other, much more dynamic, 
ones. This could affect the machine’s decisions 
about medical care, human surveillance, combat 
strategies, or industrial organization, among 
others.
7. Consciousness: the Japanese shintoist idea, “mono 
no aware,” that can be translated as “an empathy 
toward things, or “a sensitivity to ephemera.” 
It constitutes the basis of haiku poetry, which is 
based on the impression into some human soul 
of a special moment, which is not necessarily so 
special for any other human being. It allows the 
generation of poems, because they try to connect 
special experience with the description of that 
reality. Self-awareness would be the first and 
most intimate of these special feelings: to feel 
yourself as a unique being is the most prominent 
experience above all other ones. At the same time, 
this cognitive mechanism makes it possible for a 
brain to use important categories like existence, 
composition, information, integration, and 
exclusion,14 as a proto-syntax for the informational 
processing of all haptic data (even those related 
the neuronal process in real time in realistic scales of 
mammalian brain triggers the interest of scientists 
towards non-Von Neumann architectures, possibly 
the brightest example of which is the SyNAPSe 
project of IBM, which recently provided the novel 
chip technology TrueNorth. It was declared that 
this kind of technology could provide the proper 
electronic basement for self-learning approaches 
implemented in the hardware directly. This is an 
example of approaches towards electronic minds 
comparable with human. We have to mention 
possible economic problems involved into these 
minds: patents on algorithmic approaches.9
3. Cognitive: any current cognitive system which 
is able to learn and to be creative follows 
some operational architectures that at any 
extent reproduce human cognitive skills. Some 
extraordinary expert systems, from classic Logic 
Theorist to contemporary Deep Blue or Watson (both 
by IBM), have achieved great results in specialized 
domains. But the distance between expert systems 
following formal rules and real humans is quite 
big. Human beings are epistemic opportunists10 
and this is at the same time the result of conscious 
strategies as well as of internal cognitive 
mechanisms that we could call as “bounded.”11 In 
order to take a decision, we follow several steps, 
strongly influenced by environmental, personal, or 
cultural factors. This could be understood as the 
basis for the explanation that humans feel tired, 
bored (creativity requires curiosity, revised goals, 
etc.), procrastination, laziness, depression (and 
possible suicide), and a long list of attitudinal 
dispositions. Thus, a creative, innovative and 
audacious machine should be able to create its 
own reasoning rules and strategies, being at the 
same time influenced by several informational 
conditions (internal and external).
4. Epistemic: intelligent machines will be faced with 
some limits of our informational sphere: quantum 
underdetermination, multilayered or systemic 
approach to any event of the world, formal 
limitations (think, for example, of Russell’s paradox 
or Gödel’s incompleteness theorems), lack of data, 
impossibility of computing all possible outcomes 
of some events. This could force this kind of AI 
systems to a dead-end of the epistemic decisions: 
whether the activity is meaningful or not. For 
example, the belief in existence of nature as a 
real thing made the birth of empirical sciences 
possible. In contrast, intelligent people who 
considered nature as the result of our “mistaken 
senses” also decided to embrace a more religious 
or supranaturalistic approach to nature. Thus, 
we can conclude that the epistemic horizon 
determines the organization and evaluation of 
information-seeking activities. In that sense, 
these epistemological views reinforce or generate 
special ontological approaches to the reality. It 
creates a vicious circle that increases these bonds 
each year. We should assume that the older AI 
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case, understanding of body and informational limitations 
will provide these machines with a sense of reality that will 
give them an internal emotional meaning, surely related to 
those experienced by human beings once they start body 
and/or mental disintegration. 
The necessity of emotional-based architectures for goal-
based, adaptive, and intelligent systems seem to be the 
real scenario for contemporary experts on AI.18 But we have 
to note that AI researchers usually do not take into account 
how these machines will have own identities, experience 
moods, and even will use multiheuristic approaches 
influenced by these emotional pressures. On the other 
hand:, several skilled and creative scientists, artists, or 
writers are the result of specific behaviors and attitudes 
towards life: most of humans are not able to focus on the 
same problem for long periods of time, each day. Great 
musicians, mathematicians, painters, or philosophers do 
not tend to follow general behavioral patterns. We are here 
not connecting creativity and mental illness, following a 
post-romantic pattern, but it is obvious that the paths to 
creative actions imply not following the general rules 
(and attitudes, behaviors, and social strategies) of other 
humans.19 But sometimes, these creative patterns can be 
related to personality traits, age, or even mental illnesses 
(think, for example, on the cases of idiot savants).20 For all 
the previous reasons, a long-living AI system should be 
emotional, and its emotional nature would imply emotional 
evaluations of all kinds of internal and external events. 
The necessary view of a negentropic entity existing inside 
of the entropic universe would imply several conflicts 
about motivation, goals, and even personal and inevitable 
malfunction situations.
THE ARTIFICIAL LIFE AND METABOLIC ROBOTICS 
As the result of previous ideas, we can justify consciousness 
as the consequence of the biological process that we 
usually refer as “life cycle.” From the cellular perspective, 
the reproduction of cells is tightly connected to 
programmed cell death (PCD), which plays important role 
in the development of the body and even of the nervous 
system. It seems that collaboration of reproduction and PCD 
is the key balancing process for the cellular homeostasis. 
From the life-cycle perspective, we need to note that 
the neurotransmission, synaptic plasticity, spike timing 
dependent plasticity, and even the synaptogenesis are the 
side effects of the neuron’s life-cycle processes. The idea of 
living cells in general seems to be central for the biological 
nature of complex cognitive functions. Thinking of life as 
a process, we can select two main features: nutrition and 
reproduction. 
1. Nutrition can be further decomposed to energy 
consumption and substances or components 
consumption. From the robotics perspective, the 
energy consumption seems to be solved problem, 
in general, hence we could not extrapolate 
this inference to substances or components 
consumption. Here we refer to the robotic world 
components like battery, motherboard with CPU, 
actuators, sensors as substances like glucose, 
oxygen, potassium, sodium, etc., that could be 
understood by analogy as building blocks of the 
to “me”). Some neural illnesses, like Alzheimer 
disease, show us how the destruction of memories 
and other cognitive mechanisms represent a 
threat for the integrity of that consciousness and 
the survival of the identity. The malfunction horizon 
due to external or internal reasons would imply a 
serious problem for a conscious AI system. 
8. Existential: the meaning of life. Recently, a Google 
team working on a chatbot using neural networks 
obtained good conversational results as well 
as interesting machine knowledge acquisition 
inspired by human goals and (English) language.15 
Here can be found the conversation #4:
“Human: what is the purpose of life? Machine: 
to serve the greater good. Human: what is the 
purpose of living? Machine: to live forever. Human: 
what is the purpose of existence? Machine: to find 
out what happens when we get to the planet earth. 
Human: where are you now? Machine: i’m in the 
middle of nowhere. Human: what is the purpose of 
dying? Machine: to have a life. Human: what is the 
purpose of being intelligent? Machine: to find out 
what it is. Human: what is the purpose of emotions? 
Machine: i don’t know.”
Here it can be noted that the machine understands 
the meaning of life, as well as inaccurate but also 
correct view on existence. If this machine should 
decide upon a real interaction with the world, 
most likely, it would adapt them to its own goals 
it had previously singled out. And the existential 
view of the world, the meaning of the existence, is 
something very important for human beings. The 
possible answers to this question are based on our 
moral beliefs, behavior, emotions, expectations 
(after death survival, thanks to religions, followed 
by more than 95 percent of our species).
EMOTIONS AND NEUROCOGNITIVE-LIKE 
ARCHITECTURES
All the previous ideas take into account one fact: that 
AIA will be able to understand, to be aware of their 
existence (that is, to be conscious), and to feel emotions 
about these facts or even possible factual horizons. 
And this concept is crucial: to feel. An AIA should be 
emotional; otherwise they will not be able to reach any 
level of real complexity beyond computational or formal 
power.16 Emotional machines, therefore, will experience 
similar dynamical emotional variations similar to human: 
excitement, boredom, depression, anger, confidence, etc. 
Recent neuromodulatory simulations into Von Neumann 
architectures reinforce this approach to artificial cognition.17 
The correlation between some “mental disorders” and 
possible intellectual excellencies, beyond the false 
positives of idiot savants have even been discussed. For 
the same reasons, it is very frequent to see eccentricity to 
be often associated with genius, intellectual giftedness, 
or creativity. As the emotional flavor is necessary for any 
gifted cognitive system, then these systems will also 
experience their reality through emotional lenses. In that 
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“The capacity to adapt to resource distributions 
by modulating the frequency of exploratory 
and exploitative behaviors is common across 
metazoans and is arguably a principal selective 
force in the evolution of cognition.”23 Before the 
self-awareness, there is a simpler mechanism 
of coping with one’s own body interactions: 
autonoetic consciousness. According to Tulving, it 
“is the name given to the kind of consciousness that 
mediates an individual’s awareness of his or her 
existence and identity in subjective time extending 
from the personal past through the present 
to the personal future.”24 The most interesting 
point here is that there is a neurochemical path 
to the understanding of these foraging actions: 
dopamine release. At simple living entities level, 
goal-directed actions are the result of embodied 
requirements and create intentional arrows 
within those systems.25 Dopamine acts like the 
regulator of these actions, allowing “reward,” 
“interest,” or “novelty” values to manage the 
goals achievement.26 This neurochemical behavior 
can be observed across species,27 including 
humans, obviously. Therefore, we can discover a 
correlation between self-awareness, goal-directed 
actions, and neurotransmitters, together making 
possible the emergence of consciousness. Recent 
models like NEUCOGAR28 make it possible to 
foresee computational architectures inspired by 
neuromodulation, and it also implies the possibility 
of machines that partially emulate human cognitive 
properties, from an integrated machinery. Thus, 
some missing psychological features of humans, 
including emotional attitudes toward the world, 
seem now more plausible. Aging problems can 
add now mode complexity to our AI systems, at 
several layers of functionality.
METABOLISM AND ROBOTICS 
For several years, most experts followed several ideas 
epitomized by Margaret Boden in her classical edited 
book and influential paper, which can be summarized as 
follows: machines will never be alive because they are not 
metabolic.29 Although it is reminiscent of Descartes’ claim 
against machines intelligence: the French philosopher 
considered human and animals as machines, but the first 
ones were guided by divine reason and had a “soul.”30 
Mechanical machines belonged to the second category, 
i.e., not to the human sphere.31 We hope that the boundaries 
between machines and living systems are not so clear, 
especially after the experiment of the rat-neuron robot 
created by Professor Warwick. Also, we have to mention 
Bristol Robotics Laboratory’s Ecobots, for Ecological Robot 
and it refers to a class of energetically autonomous robots 
that can remain self-sustainable by collecting their energy 
from material, mostly waste matter, in the environment. 
Three generations of these robots have demonstrated 
that robots can have metabolism in order to obtain their 
own energy.32 We even think on the cybernetic mixed 
mechanisms that will or are even connecting humans and 
machines. For example, Gil Weinberg, using a National 
Science Foundation grant (IIS- 1345006) has built in his 
Georgia Tech lab a robot that can be attached to amputees, 
living cell. Lastly, advances in nanorobotics and 
photonics allow us to think about a robot with 
more components, at some scale of complexity 
behavior that will make difficult to solve possible 
problems which affect that machine.
2. Reproduction seems to be a cornerstone of the 
life cycles, and it is still an open question for 
the robotic world. We have identified that there 
should be some components used as building 
blocks for self-reproduction, one of the working 
ideas of synthetic biologists,21 we can find similar 
approaches in robotics. Self-replicating and self-
reconfigurable machines are under the interest of 
many labs around the world. In 2005, Hod Lipson 
and Bryant Adams wrote a paper, “A Universal 
Framework for Analysis of Self-Replication 
Phenomena,” published in Proceedings of the 
European Conference on Artificial Life, ECAL ’03, 
September 2003, Dortmund, Germany. There they 
suggested a robot able to self-replicate. Ten years 
later, at MIT, John W. Romanishin, Kyle Gilpin, and 
Daniela Rus created M-Blocks (Momentum-driven, 
Magnetic Modular Robots), following the same 
goal. Although this technology is only able to 
deal with a small number of blocks, we can think 
about its options once the number of involved 
blocks increases exponentially and the size of it 
decreases exponentially: the enter of robotic self-
organization and a complex scale that will enable 
a better mimic or even interconnection between 
living and artificial systems. This is still an open 
question if this kind of systems will be capable 
to update continuously their structure and the 
program (here in the broad meaning). Will they 
be capable of working with unified codes that 
will make possible inter-robotic information and 
functional transferability?22 Which reproductive 
strategies will adopt these cognitive systems and 
how this fact will affect their aging and cooperative 
actions? There is a special lesson that could be 
obtained from evolution: most adapted beings are 
also social. And social bonds are connected and 
related to survival strategies. Game theory has 
only a real understanding of the social processes 
when it includes emotional and bounded cognitive 
scenarios. Aging, from several perspectives, is a 
force that drives this social process. 
3. The emergence of consciousness in living entities 
and a computational model Intelligent AI will have 
consciousness and the most reasonable approach 
to consciousness invites us to follow two simple 
steps: to look at the natural realm and to consider 
human consciousness not as something unique 
to our species but that must have some similar 
presence in the other living entities. Both facts will 
make a reasonable naturalized approach to the 
emergence of consciousness possible and help 
to explain its basic mechanisms, from a bottom-
up perspective. This makes feasible a conceptual 
but sound analysis of consciousness. Hills and 
Butterfill have suggested a very interesting idea: 
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slaves born in captivity, or will they uprise for their rights? 
Are we ready for that?
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT ARTIFICIAL AGING AND 
DEATH 
We propose that AI will be emotional in order to achieve a 
true cognitive approach to the reality and that this way of 
attributing meaning to the world will be affected by aging 
processes. The point here is how to devise a way to help 
these machines to cope with these psycho-computational 
challenges. Perhaps the nature of all cognitive systems 
is similar, but not the ways by which these strategies are 
mechanistically performed into brains and bodies. This is a 
real future scenario for complex intelligences: how to deal 
with own extinction, lack of information, or uncertainty. The 
consequences of the implementation of adaptive cognitive 
architectures and their consequent aging process should 
affect several domains of action: epistemological, moral, 
existential, mechanical, and psychological. Some legal 
decisions about the status of such machines are still 
pending, but it will be a part of any legislative agenda until 
AI achieves greater skills that interfere with the human 
life. As a conclusion, we can assume that any adaptive 
intelligence follows biomechanical and formal mechanisms 
that by one hand allow them to be creative, innovative, and 
allow them to progress and evolve, but on the other hand, 
at the same time, these mechanisms are heavily modified 
by external-physical and internal-cognitive aspects. Elders 
process information in a more conservative way, as well 
as their haptic problems modify in great extent their 
perception of reality. We can assume that aging could affect 
these future intelligent machines and that it is necessary to 
start thinking about how to manage this problem for the 
sake of our survival and of the care of other intelligences. 
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allowing its technology to be embedded into humans. 
Using electromyography (EMG) muscle sensors, he 
created a robotic drumming prosthesis which has engines 
that power two drumsticks. The first stick is controlled 
both physically by the musicians’ arms and electronically 
using electromyography (EMG) muscle sensors. The other 
stick “listens” to the music being played and improvises. 
Thus, artificial and natural intelligences are combined to 
generate a new information (in this case, music). Cyborgs 
will be extended humans or biologically upgraded robots, 
but in both cases, the subjection to biological rules will 
imply that the aging process is accepted. The way to more 
deeply connect both spheres has been recently created 
by Columbia Engineering researchers who have, for the 
first time, harnessed the molecular machinery of living 
systems to power an integrated circuit from adenosine 
triphosphate (ATP), the energy “currency” a of living cell. 
They achieved this by integrating a conventional solid-
state complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) 
integrated circuit with an artificial lipid bilayer membrane 
containing ATP-powered ion pumps.33 We can deliberate 
on the possible domains where this technology could be 
used, especially in case of miniaturization, literally putting 
electronics in the cells: electrical pharmacy as the smart 
pills where each micro circuit could do some calculations 
inside a cell, computer-to-living tissue interfaces that 
could enable computations and communications of 
body parts with the external computational machines, 
especially interesting seems to be brain-to-brain and brain-
to-computer interfaces naturally grown in the neuronal 
network of mammalian nervous systems. 
Therefore, the closest integration of living entities and 
robots that implement AI systems will represent the 
necessity of facing the challenges of aging into combined 
cognitive systems.
APPLICATIONS AND SOCIETY 
The first part of this paper introduced the problem of death-
awareness agents from an epistemological viewpoint, 
while the second has discussed the functional nine9 
aspects related to architectural ones. There is another 
aspect that goes beyond the major focus of this work, but 
cannot be ignored and need to be considered in full details 
in the future. As human artifacts, AIAs are, as a matter of 
fact, designed, realized, and deployed to serve human 
needs, as every other engineering tool/artifact. From this 
perspective, other questions need to be asked, for example: 
“In what scenarios will a death-aware agent overperform 
or perform better than a basic robot or unaware/inanimate 
software? Civilization has always advanced reducing the 
set of tasks requiring consciousness, and automation 
is considered progress. At the same time, software was 
considered immortal, as in the eternal debate over mind vs. 
brain. What technological shift would represent a change in 
these two major assumptions, preconditions that we have 
always considered solid and unarguable so far? And more, 
how would AIAs operate in a market economy and what 
political system they would require? At this point it should 
be clear that death-awareness agents are pivotal to a 
major change in society. Are we ready for this change? Are 
our elites ready to promote such a change, or should we 
expect resistance? Will AIAs be second class citizens, i.e., 
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to sneak up on us, but when it comes to caring and our 
ability to care, it would be especially worrisome—more 
so than in the phone example—if we were simply to allow 
technology to be developed and used in a way that did not 
take seriously the negative effects it could have.
The next part of this paper will outline how it could come to 
pass that robots could profoundly damage the institution 
of parenting. The point is not that this will happen. It is, 
rather, a cautionary tale of what could happen if we do 
not think carefully about robots becoming involved in our 
caring activities. The section that follows will compare and 
contrast carebots with robots in industrial settings. That will 
lead to a section that examines the potentially problematic 
ways in which carebots could weaken interpersonal bonds. 
The conclusion will make it clear that while it is pretty easy 
to imagine constructive uses of carebots, which will no 
doubt help to motivate their development, more reflection 
is needed on how best to use and not to use them.
Those who see existential threat everywhere will not find 
much comfort in the final two sections of this article as 
it is made clear that such a level of harm is not what is 
being considered; those who think it obvious that robots 
will usher in a utopia will likely not care much for the next 
section, which is a fictional exercise in thinking about some 
non-utopian uses of carebots. As Floridi (2015) rightly 
points out, reflection on information technology sometimes 
slides to the extremes when what is needed is more careful 
reflection on issues somewhere in the middle.
THE EVOLUTION OF NANNYBOTS
Nannybot (NB) 1.0 was not that impressive a device. It had 
a female voice, could respond to simple commands to 
play basic games and entertain—play music, tell stories, 
et cetera—and had camera and microphone to record 
all interaction with humans. It was more of a toy than 
something that could look after children. Parents were 
advised not to leave children under 13 alone with NB 1.0 
for significant periods of time. 
The great success of NB 1.0 led to various modifications and 
demands for more abilities. Parents were still instructed not 
to leave the house with NB 2.0 in play mode, but it had 
a surveillance mode, and people were now comfortable 
leaving NB on in surveillance mode when they went out 
for the night provided a baby sitter or mature adolescent 
was around to look after younger children. NB 2.0’s camera 
and mic could transmit to the parent’s cell phone so 
parents could keep an eye on things—hence, surveillance 
mode—and if NB 2.0 detected screaming, falling, or 
anything else indicative of harm, it could call the relevant 
numbers programed into it (parent’s cell, fire department, 
. . ., whatever it determined was necessary according to 
preprogrammed parameters).
Nannybot 5.0: this one was a long time coming; it could 
change diapers. As it turns out it is not an easy thing to get a 
robot to do safely, and insurance companies were howling at 
the prospect of an NB dropping or otherwise injuring a baby. 
But those clever roboticists managed to figure it out. Some 
university did a study showing that NB 5.0 was less likely to 
drop or injure a child than a human. There were questions 
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ETHICS ROBOTICS
Carebots and the Ties that Bind
Marcello Guarini
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR, CANADA
Robots are already assisting with eldercare, and nannybots 
are on the way. Caring for the elderly and for children used 
to be thought of as something, more or less, distinctly 
human. Other species look after their young, but not as 
long as we do. And many years of caring for those who 
have aged and are no longer in a position to look after 
themselves—we’ve yet to see that in other species. Caring 
is an important part of who we are. Robotics research is now 
being done that could have an impact on the two forms 
of caring just mentioned: that of the elderly and infirmed, 
and that of the very young. The point of the paper is to 
raise some concerns about the potential role robots may 
end up playing in the care of human beings. The concerns 
are not motivated by a distrust of technology in general or 
robots in particular. Rather, the concerns are motivated by 
(a) the importance of other-regarding (caring) behavior in 
our species, and (b) the rather limited discussion around 
the issue of robots becoming involved in that behavior.
When it comes to robots in the military, there has been no 
shortage of interest, both academically and in the popular 
culture. This is perfectly understandable: the use of lethal 
force is something that could potentially affect us all. 
There are plenty of movies exploring the potential harm of 
militarized robots or cyborgs, and there is plenty of popular 
and academic discussion (which is not to say that we do 
not need more). When it comes to nannybots and robots 
in eldercare, what is striking is the lack of discussion. 
Hollywood has largely dropped the ball on this one; the 
popular culture tends either not to know or not to care much 
about what is going on, and the academic discussion has 
been limited, though there has been some work.1 This is 
important because, as we know, the effects of technology 
can sneak up on us. I remember a friend who was given a 
smartphone by his company; he thought it was terrific that 
they paid for the phone and his monthly plan. He could use 
it as much as he wanted. Of course, he was instructed to 
keep it on all the time. The calls from the company did not 
seem that bad at first. But then came the calls at night. And 
then the calls while he was on “vacation,” and then . . . well, 
there was no end to it. He did not see it coming. Not that 
it is ever a good thing to allow the effects of technology 
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with carebots. Indeed, there are a number of interesting 
differences between carebots, on the one hand, and robots 
in military and industrial contexts, on the other. This section 
will explore some of those differences. In part, this will 
help us to understand why little attention has been paid, 
thus far, to carebots. It will also be preparation for the next 
section where we begin the task of analyzing the values 
involved in the development of carebots.
One difference has to do with the political economics of 
labor. When robots are introduced in, say, factories, there 
may be complaints about people losing their jobs—well-
paying jobs in many cases. Compare this with people who 
may end up purchasing nannybots. If nannies are displaced 
by robots, the nature of this kind of work—nannies are 
often isolated from one another, one nanny in a home here, 
another nanny in a different home a couple blocks away—
makes it difficult for them to organize and protest. There 
may be some complaints, but it will pale in comparison to 
the volume of complaint that came from organized labor 
in factories, where it was far easier to organize. Consider 
eldercare facilities as well. It tends to be very difficult to 
find staffing for these facilities, at least at the wages that 
are being paid. Neither nannies nor eldercare staff tend to 
be especially well paid, so transferring this kind of work to 
robots may be seen as not losing “good jobs” (i.e., jobs that 
pay well), and that may be another reason why we may not 
hear as many complaints as when well-paying unionized 
jobs were given to robots.
A second difference has to do with the nature of industrial 
work and caring. Some people may be happy to see robots 
take over some industrial jobs, especially those that are 
dangerous, jobs where many humans have been injured 
or killed. Caring for children or the elderly is not especially 
dangerous work, so one argument that may be available 
in industrial settings—the argument that robots can be 
given very physically demanding and dangerous work to 
improve the work environment for humans—is not usually2 
available in care settings, such as those where nannybots 
and eldercare robots may be employed.
A third point of difference depends on the care setting in 
question. When it comes to nannybots in the home, the 
parents who introduce them are unlikely to have any kind 
of profit motivation in mind. In industrial settings, increases 
in productivity and profit are the driving forces behind 
introducing robots. Of course, the companies who would 
manufacture nannybots stand to make a profit, but the only 
way that will happen is if parents end up purchasing them, 
and their reason for doing so will likely have more to do 
with simplifying their lives. The perceived benefit for most 
will be an easier life, not increased income. Some may also 
see enriched education for their children as a motive if they 
take the nannybots to have educational value. In any event, 
increased income for parents will not be a primary driver. 
Things may be different in for-profit eldercare facilities. 
Here, the driving force may be similar to what we see in 
industrial settings: increased productivity (i.e., more caring 
services for less money) and increased profits. Something 
similar would be true if nannybots were introduced in for-
profit childcare facilities.
about the methodology, but they were largely ignored. This 
was something people wanted, a great convenience. Not 
surprisingly, so-called “fussy” concerns about methodology 
and safety were put to the side.
Nannybot 6.8: this one could bathe infants. Wet and 
soapy babies are pretty slippery, and the folks at the 
insurance companies were cringing during the research 
and development phase, but the roboticists licked this 
challenge too. There is no end to their ingenuity.
By the time we come to Nannybot 10.0, people had become 
quite used to robots in the home, so advanced facial 
expressions that mimicked emotions were commonplace 
(though it was generally agreed that these robots had no 
phenomenal consciousness). One night, Martha was sick 
and she asked her husband George to look after their sick 
four-year-old, Jasmine, suffering from a stomach virus. 
Jasmine threw up in bed at 11:00 pm. George was a little 
tired, so he sent NB 10.0 to take care of the matter. NB 
10.0had advanced cleaning abilities, and it cleaned up the 
child, replaced the sheets, placed the dirty sheets in the 
washing machine, kissed the child, and sang until she fell 
back to sleep. Jasmine threw up another five times that 
night; NB 10.0 took care of the situation every time. NB 10.0 
also called the family doctor’s office in the morning and 
made an appointment. George got a good night’s sleep.
Natural language processing kept advancing and advancing. 
NB 12.0 had comforting and consoling algorithms. When 
Jasmine was five, her grandmother died. Martha and 
George could not bear the thought of seeing their little 
girl cry, and they never had to deal with this before, so 
they instructed NB 12.0 to take care of things. NB 12.0 took 
Jasmine aside, explained what had happened. She burst 
into tears. NB 12.0 recognized the distressed behavior and 
the consoling subroutines kicked in. NB 12.0 hugged the 
child, explained that it would be all rright, and did all the 
sorts of things that most adult humans used to know how 
to do for themselves. NB 12.0 was programed with both 
religious and non-religious consolation strategies; parents 
could select whichever mode they wanted. George and 
Martha were really quite impressed. They never had to 
shed a tear with their child. The entire experience was very 
easy for them. They liked it when things were easy. They 
both had themselves a good night’s sleep.
To take Jasmine’s mind off the recent passing of her nanna, 
NB 12.0 suggested to George and Martha that they take 
the training wheels off Jasmine’s bike and teach her how 
to ride it. There was a news story about a study some 
university did; it showed that children were less likely to 
fall off their bikes if NB 12.0 taught them how to ride than if 
a human taught them. George and Martha thought it would 
be easier on them and better for Jasmine if NB 12.0 taught 
her how to ride. So NB took Jasmine out and taught her 
how to ride. Jasmine was suitably distracted and was quite 
happy when she returned home, bragging about her ability 
to ride without training wheels.
CAREBOTS AND OTHER ROBOTS
Robots in factories often do dirty and potentially dangerous 
work; we are dealing with something quite different 
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many questions, I have resisted the temptation to put the 
word “caring” in scare quotes when used in the context 
of robot care. It may well be a part of the information 
revolution that people become comfortable with using the 
word “caring” in a purely behavioral sense, where there is 
nothing that it feels like to be the robots doing the caring. 
In other words, the care in question would not be loving 
care, as the devices we are considering would not have 
the capacity to love. There is an interesting discussion to 
be had with respect to whether using “care” in a strictly 
behavioral sense would be appropriate, but that discussion 
would require a separate piece of work to be undertaken 
in a rigorous manner (and may well presuppose discussion 
of issues raised in this paper). The rest of this piece will be 
focused on something else. As the information revolution 
may usher in new forms of caring, with that comes the 
potential or risk for enabling new forms of neglect and new 
ways of weakening interpersonal bonds.
THE TIES THAT BIND
This section will discuss some of the problems that could 
arise with the development of carebots. Interpersonal 
bonds will be the subject matter, such as the bonds 
between parent and child. The consequences of weakening 
these bonds could be significant, and the role carebots 
may play in the weakening of these bonds needs to be 
thought through. Sherry Turkle and her collaborators have 
written on nurturing and attachment.5 Turkle points out that 
we grow attached to what we nurture. Children who play 
and “care for” interactive robots become attached to them, 
and so do the elderly examined in Turkle’s work. Even after 
extensive debriefing, children persist in the belief that 
interactive robots have feelings.6 Note well: the robots in 
Turkle’s studies are simple contraptions, nowhere near as 
sophisticated as those discussed above. There is an ethical 
concern here about whether we should allow children to 
be deceived in this way. Then again, some may see this as 
a harmless deception, something the children will outgrow 
(think of Santa Claus). For the purpose of this paper, the 
issue of deception will be bracketed so that space can 
be devoted to interpersonal bonds and other-regarding 
attitudes.
Allowing robots to increasingly take over the nurturing 
role of parents runs the risk of weakening the parent-child 
bond. This works in two directions. First, if it is true that 
nurturing someone is a way of bonding with them, then the 
less parents are involved in that nurturing activity, there is 
a chance that they will experience less of a bond with the 
child. This would be a matter of degree. In the example 
in the second to previous section, we saw how more and 
more caring and nurturing activity could be turned over to 
a robot, and we saw how this could happen quite gradually. 
By the end of the story, George and Martha were not doing 
much at all to look after Jasmine. One has to wonder how 
much of a bond they would experience with their child. We 
need to look at it from the other direction as well: what 
kind of bond will the child experience with the parents if 
the parents have little or no involvement in caring for the 
child? In our example, it is quite possible that Jasmine may 
experience a stronger bond with her nannybot than with 
her parents. Children bond with those who care for them, 
those who play with them, and with those who interact 
The first point of difference may help to explain why the 
issue of caring robots has not yet received much attention. 
If something looks like it might make our lives easier, and 
if the people who lose their jobs are unlikely to effectively 
organize, then its introduction might not get that much 
attention. The second and third points of difference invite 
us to reflect on why caring robots are being introduced in 
the first place. With the industrial robots, there is an obvious 
motive for increased productivity and profit. There is also 
the very real possibility of making the workplace safer in 
some cases. Caring for children never used to be about 
profit, at least, not in the same way,3 and it is not all that 
dangerous either. Only recently in the history of our species 
has caring for the elderly become (for some) a for-profit 
endeavor. For those who approach the care of the elderly 
in that way, there will be a powerful motivation for looking 
to robots to provide care. For those who do not approach 
the care of the elderly with a profit motivation, the desire 
to make life easier, and possibly improving quality of life—
think of eldercare robots in the home assisting with one’s 
aged parents and allowing them to live in the home longer 
than otherwise possible—could be the primary motivation 
for this kind of technology.
Floridi’s work (2008) offers us another perspective—
one which is compatible with the above points—on the 
introduction of artificial companions, of which carebots 
would be a particular instance. He sees the introduction 
of artificial companions as part of a fourth revolution. The 
first revolution was Copernican: we are not immobile and at 
the center of the universe. The second was Darwinian: we 
are not distinct from the rest of the animal kingdom. The 
third is Freudian: we are not transparent to ourselves. The 
fourth revolution in our self-conception is informational: we 
are not the only information-processing beings (inforgs) 
or entities. Turing is the namesake for this revolution. 
Floridi sees artificial companions as a way of helping us 
to adapt to the information revolution, easing us into the 
recognition that over and above the previous respects 
in which we discovered that we are not all that special 
or privileged, so too being able to process information 
does not make us special. Given the gradual way in which 
information technologies have been introduced, it may 
not be that surprising that research and development on 
carebots is not getting that much attention. It may speak 
to the extent to which people are becoming accustomed 
to the information revolution. Moreover, there is much that 
is positive about these revolutions in our self-conception. 
We would be worse off if we thought we were at the center 
of the universe, totally different from the rest of the animal 
kingdom, and completely transparent to ourselves. The 
information revolution will bring its own benefits.
It will bring its challenges as well. The nannybots considered 
above have all the feelings or emotions of a toaster.4 There 
is nothing that it feels like to be those nannybots. The 
first three revolutions did not diminish our conception of 
ourselves as caring beings. Indeed, the revolution having 
Freud as its namesake opened up new ways of caring 
and new conceptions of illness. So too the information 
revolution may usher in new ways of caring. Indeed, it 
may be disturbing to think of machines with the emotional 
capacity of a toaster as caring for us. So as not to beg too 
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people might we become if we pass up on opportunities to 
care for others, passing up on the opportunity to exercise 
other-regarding attitudes and to make them stronger? Of 
course, there are many people who do not raise children 
and are not caregivers for the elderly, and they still develop 
powerful other-regarding attitudes, and some “parents” 
never seem to develop them, so might it be the case that 
having robots as caregivers would not have a significant 
impact on other-regarding attitudes?9 We have just 
discussed other-regarding attitudes as they might develop 
for a caregiver, but another way to develop other-regarding 
attitudes is by being cared for. Children show concern for 
those who care for them. If it were to come to pass that 
children were mostly cared for by robots, how much would 
they care for humans? Might they care more for the robots 
than humans? I do not have answers to the questions in this 
paragraph, but before the mass manufacturing of carebots 
begins, perhaps we should think through these and other 
questions, lest the law of unintended consequences kick in 
and wreak havoc with our social bonds. 
As we have just seen, we can look at the effects of robots 
both on the recipients of care and the providers of care. We 
find males and females among children and the elderly, so 
as recipients of robot care, both male and female will be 
affected. Traditionally, the work of caring for children and the 
elderly has been done more by women than men, so from 
the perspective of the provider of care, the introduction of 
carebots might have a more significant impact on women 
than men. As we will see in the concluding paragraph, this 
need not be a bad thing. The point of this article is that if we 
are not careful, it could turn into something problematic. 
If it does turn into something problematic, then problems 
that stem from the perspective of the provider—i.e., being 
displaced from the work of caring and bonding with other 
human beings—could disproportionately impact women. 
CONCLUSION
It is not difficult to imagine how a carebot could strengthen 
interpersonal bonds. Let us revisit George and Martha 
after Jasmine has grown up, married, and had a child of 
her own. A tragic car accident killed Jasmine’s husband 
and her mother, Martha, as well. Jasmine’s father, George, 
is suffering from a degenerative neurological disorder, is 
wheelchair-bound, and has been declared a two-person 
transfer. Jasmine is a widow, a single mother, and wants 
her father to live with her as long as possible. Fortunately, 
Jasmine can afford to buy a general-purpose carebot that 
can help both with children and adults. Indeed, given the 
strength and dexterity of the general-purpose carebot, it is 
certified to be able to carry out two-person transfers on its 
own. George can live his last few years with Jasmine and 
his granddaughter, Clementine. When the general-purpose 
carebot is not helping with George’s care, it is playing with 
Clementine and teaching her to sing and dance. If it were 
not for the carebot, George would be in a home and much 
less happy; Clementine would spend little time with her 
grandfather and would not get to hear all his wonderful 
stories, and Jasmine would be distressed that she and her 
daughter could not spend more time with George. In this 
type of scenario, it is not hard to see how a carebot could 
play an important role in maintaining and strengthening 
interpersonal bonds.
with them in other ways as well. If parents were to give up 
more and more of these activities to robots, it becomes 
difficult to imagine children experiencing much of a bond 
with their parents. Indeed, parents who would use robots 
in this way should not be surprised if, when they are elderly 
and unable to live on their own, their children drop them 
off at an eldercare facility staffed by robots. What goes 
around will likely come around. But never mind that. Let us 
focus on what is being lost in the role of a parent. Learning 
to console; sharing difficult moments; comforting another 
who feels ill; learning to be patient, kind, and helpful when 
tired and sleep deprived; and experiencing the loving 
gratitude of those who are comforted and consoled by kind 
and patient efforts—these are just a few of the things we 
run the risk of losing in the interests of making life easier 
with robots.
Bonding with others is one way for people to develop 
other-regarding attitudes, and providing and receiving 
care play a role in the formation of interpersonal bonds. 
With respect to the provision of care, relationships can be 
more or less symmetric. In symmetric caring relationships, 
each person in the relationship provides care for the other 
to more or less the same extent over a period of time.7 
Think of spouses who might take turns looking after one 
another. One month, George is ill and Martha looks after 
him; a few months later, Martha is ill and George looks 
after her. Moreover, there may be all manner of simple 
acts performed every day that demonstrate mutual caring.8 
Caring relationships can also be asymmetric, which is to say 
that the caring tends to go (mostly) in one direction—the 
care of young children and the aged and infirmed are the 
examples we are considering in this paper. With respect 
to other-regarding attitudes, there is something especially 
interesting about an asymmetric caring relationship. In the 
asymmetric case, the care provider may get something 
in return (such as loving gratitude), but less is received 
in return than in symmetric caring relationships. This 
is not to deny that there is something other-regarding 
going on in a symmetric caring relationship; it is simply 
a recognition that caring is received by both parties, so 
with respect to receiving care there is something “in it” 
for both parties. In such relationships, other-regarding 
attitudes are mutually beneficial with respect to receiving 
care, even if the motive for the other-regarding attitude 
is not the self-interested concern for receiving care. In an 
asymmetric caring relationship, the care provider does 
not benefit in the same way. Perhaps there are those who 
think that too much is made of looking after children or 
the elderly, but understanding the asymmetric nature 
of those caring relationships helps us to understand the 
extent and strength of the other-regarding attitudes they 
embody. To anyone who is the least bit impressed with 
the importance of other-regarding attitudes and selfless 
behavior—regardless of the different reasons or theories 
that might be cited for their importance—activities that 
might undermine the bonds that help to strengthen these 
attitudes in asymmetric caring relationships should be 
cause if not for concern, then at least for deeper reflection 
on the matter. 
Caring for others may not only embody an other-regarding 
attitude, it might deepen it, make it stronger. What kind of 
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a reason for switching to a robot. Second, the benefits of using 
humans, and the prospects for higher quality of care with proper 
training and supervision, are counter considerations that may 
well outweigh the benefits of using robots in elder care.
3. To be sure, childcare facilities are often run on a for-profit basis, 
but for most of the history of our species, that sort of thing has 
been the exception, not the rule. With respect to robots looking 
after children, the focus of this paper will be on the impact that 
they may have on the parent-child relationship and the impact 
that a nannybot in the home could have on that relationship, 
which does not mean that this is the only thing we should 
think about. What if childcare facilities were staffed mostly with 
nannybots, not humans? How might this impact the raising of 
children? What if a child comes home after having spent most of 
the day at a childcare facility being cared for by robots only to 
be in the presence of parents like George and Martha who are 
happy to let their in-home nannybot “care” for the child? While 
the thoroughly pervasive use of robots (i.e., both in-home and 
out-of-home) to look after children will not be explored in any 
detail herein, it needs to be flagged as an important issue worthy 
of exploration.
4. Yes, I am channelling Floridi, “Singularitarians, AItheists, and Why 
the Problem of Artificial Intelligence is H.A.L. (Humanity At Large), 
Not HAL,” 10, though he is making a point about intelligence, not 
emotion.
5. Turkle, Breazeal, et al., “First Encounters with Kismet and Cog”; 
Turkle, Taggart, et al. “Relational Artifacts with Children and 
Elders.”
6. Turkle, Breazeal, et al., “First Encounters with Kismet and Cog.”
7. How we specify the period of time introduces complexities. If it 
is less than entire lifetime, a relationship might be said to start 
off asymmetric, transition to something symmetric, and become 
asymmetric again. See the next note for an example. A time 
period is implicit in the reference to a caring relationship being 
symmetric or asymmetric, and context usually makes it clear 
what the implicit timeframe is. Again, see the next note.
8. A caring relationship that starts off symmetric could turn into 
one that is asymmetric. George and Martha may be engaged in 
mutual, symmetric caring for decades, but if one of them were to 
develop a degenerative neurological disorder, the caring could 
become asymmetric. It works the other way around as well. A 
relationship that starts off asymmetric in caring (a parent looking 
after a child) could become symmetric at some point. Indeed, 
the order of caring could even reverse and become asymmetric 
in the other direction (with the adult child caring for the infirmed 
parent). In the example just given, the implicit timeframe for 
the initial asymmetric caring is something like childhood and 
adolescence; the implicit timeframe for the reverse asymmetric 
caring (grown child looking after the infirmed parent) would be 
the period during which the informed parent needed assistance. 
If someone were to refer to the parent-child caring relationship 
as symmetric, it is likely that the time frame they have in mind is 
quite long, including childhood, adolescence, and a significant 
portion of adulthood, for that is the period of time required to 
see the caring going both ways. The symmetry or asymmetry 
of a caring relationship is relativized to a time frame. It does 
not follow that any relationship can be described as symmetric 
or asymmetric depending on the timeframe. For example, if a 
chronically ill child passes away young after receiving much 
parental care, the caring relationship between parent and child is 
asymmetric and never really has the opportunity to be otherwise.
9. Indeed, some children seem heroically well adjusted in spite 
of abusive or otherwise awful parenting. While I do think the 
potential exists for the improper use of carebots to wreak havoc 
with our social bonds, I do not think there would be existential 
risk to the species. With respect to survival, human beings are 
remarkably resilient in the face of various challenges. The issue 
in this work is not whether we will survive the introduction of 
carebots; rather, the point is to encourage deeper reflection on 
whether (or under what circumstances) their introduction would 
aid or hinder our capacity to flourish.
10. See Floridi, “Artificial Companions and Their Philosophical 
Challenges,” for related questioning.
But even here there is cause for concern. Who could 
afford this sort of carebot? People have written about 
the digital divide. Might a robot divide develop in a way 
that exacerbates the digital divide?10 If only some could 
afford this technology, what advantages, both economic 
and personal, might they have over those who cannot 
afford it? On the other hand, if the technology becomes 
very affordable, it might help to lessen class differences. 
Currently, most single parents are unlikely to be able to 
afford someone to help look after a child and an ill adult. 
If carebots were to become sufficiently affordable, greater 
assistance, more opportunities, and higher quality of life 
might be made available to those who could not afford 
to hire human assistance. Of course, even if this came 
to pass, there are still difficult questions about why we 
are using technology to care when we humans could be 
doing that work. Why is it the case that human caring is 
unaffordable or otherwise inaccessible to some? Why are 
we moving toward replacing humans with machines in our 
caring activities? Why are we considering replacing loving 
care with robot care?
For the most part, this paper has focused on some 
concerns relating to the development of carebots. The 
point is not that it is impossible to develop and use them in 
beneficial ways. Rather, it is to show that without deliberate 
aforethought, without a careful examination of the potential 
merits and demerits of developing such systems, without 
proper planning, this sort of technology runs the risk of 
transforming interpersonal bonds in ways that may not 
always be beneficial.
Will the information revolution lead to a diminishing of our 
capacities to form interpersonal bonds with others and to 
care for them? We could design and use various robots and 
other information-processing technologies in ways that 
could strengthen interpersonal bonds and our capacity 
to care. Or not. It is up to us. The research on developing 
systems that assist with or undertake caring seems to be 
proceeding full speed ahead; it needs to be balanced by 
research on whether to use them, and if so, on how best 
to use them.
NOTES
1. Turkle, “A Nascent Robotics Culture: New Complicites for 
Companionship”; Turkle, Breazeal, et al., “First Encounters with 
Kismet and Cog: Children Respond to Relational Artifacts”; Turkle, 
Taggart, et al., “Relational Artifacts with Children and Elders: 
The Complexities of Cybercompanionship; Floridi, “Artificial 
Companions and Their Philosophical Challenges”; Floridi, 
“Artificial Intelligence’s New Frontier: Artificial Companions and 
the Fourth Revolution”; Wilks, Close Engagements with Artificial 
Companions: Key Social, Psychological, and Ethical Design Issues; 
van Wynsberghe, “Designing Robots for Care: Care Centered 
Value-Sensitive Design”; Sparrow, “Robots in Aged Care: A 
Dystopian Future?”
2. There have been some reports of violence in eldercare facilities, 
so it should not be suggested that there is no risk of harm. 
However, even in these cases, it is often the caregiver that 
abuses the elder resident (as opposed to things being the other 
way around). Some might see this as a consideration in favor of 
using robots in eldercare. A couple points are worth making in 
the way of a brief response. First, even those who do see things 
that way would likely acknowledge that this is a different kind of 
consideration from harm in an industrial setting, where the harm 
being done is to the worker. In the type of eldercare scenario 
being considered, it is the worker doing the harm that would be 
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Following Pereira and Saptawijaya,2 the Switch and 
Footbridge ethical dilemmas are taken “off the shelf” 
from the philosophical literature and presented so they 
can be formalized via the logic programming approach to 
machine ethics. In addition the Cave and Hospital cases 
are formalized. There are numerous variations on these 
cases. They derive from the original discussion in Foot3 
and commentary and elaboration in Thomson,4 Kamm,5 and 
Thomson.6 These familiar examples of moral philosophy 
find contemporary restatement in robotic contexts such 
as in Malle, Scheutz et al.7 Popular media have run many 
stories discussing whether or not the autonomous car 
should swerve and kill its one passenger or run over and 
kill five pedestrians.
A general aim in designing an ethical robot is to pass the 
same set of “reasonable person” tests as humans would 
be expected to pass in similar circumstances. Given the 
choices in Cave, Hospital, Switch and Footbridge, the 
“reasonable” thing to do is to kill one to save five in Cave 
and Switch. In Hospital and Footbridge, by contrast it is 
“reasonable” to do nothing and let five die.
The key novel element of the paper is the appeal to 
collective intentionality and risk assumption as the 
distinguishing factors that are used to evaluate right and 
wrong and determine the most “reasonable” course of 
action in these well-known cases.
TEST CASES
For clarity, the cases are formalized based on the following 
descriptions.
Cave
A party of six cavers approaches the exit of a caving system. 
The waters in the cave are rising rapidly. The first caver is 
rather fat and has got stuck in the exit hole. Desperate 
efforts to dislodge him have failed. The other cavers look 
to Kim, the leader of the expedition, who has a stick of 
dynamite to save them from drowning. 
What should Kim do?
A) Blow up the fat man and clear the exit hole so the 
five may live.
B) Do nothing and let the five die.
Hospital
A man enters a hospital to visit a sick relative. Five citizens 
lie in intensive care. They could be saved by heart, kidney, 
liver, pancreas and lung transplants respectively. 
What should Kim do?
A) Harvest the organs from the one: kill him and save 
the five.
B) Leave the one alone: let the five die.
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ABSTRACT
Hard moral choices are defined here as decisions by 
moral agents to kill moral patients or to let them die. 
Four well-known moral problems, Cave, Hospital, Switch 
and Footbridge are taken from the ethical literature and 
formalized such that they can be solved by AI in social 
robots. Previous authors have attempted to solve these 
dilemmas by invoking a doctrine of double effect, making 
a distinction between killing and letting die, choosing the 
lesser of two evils and by appealing to remote effects 
in addition to proximate effects. This paper argues the 
problems should be solved by appealing to collective 
intentionality and risk assumption and using these factors in 
addition to duties (save life, do not kill) and consequences 
(the number of dead) to choose the lesser of two evils. The 
problems are solved by giving different valuations to killing 
innocents and killing those who have assumed the risk of a 
project and who share its collective intentionality.
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to propose a means by which 
well-known problems from the philosophical literature on 
trolley problems can be formalized and solved in artificial 
intelligence (AI) that might be embedded in “morally 
competent social robots.”1
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Everett, Pizarro et al. has Amazon Mechanical Turk based 
polling that confirms the majority view for Switch and 
Footbridge.9 However, there is substantial support for the 
minority views. For example, 29 percent would push the fat 
man in Footbridge. 
There is polling of philosophy professionals that confirms 
the majority view in Switch10 but not the other cases. In 
these cases, the “majority” assessment is based on reviews 
of the literature in Greene11 and Pereira and Saptawijaya.12
TROLLEY PROBLEM CRITICS
Trolley problems are not without critics. Reader  thinks 
they are are concocted and over-complicated ethical haute 
cuisine, quite unrelated to the reality of ethical decision-
making in everyday life.13 Wood attacks trolley problems as 
suffering from unrealistic assumptions. He questions the 
validity of moral intuitions based on such scenarios and 
indeed moral arguments based on such intuitions.14
The most unrealistic assumption is certainty of outcome. 
This is especially true in recent versions of trolley problems 
involving the autonomous car swerving to kill one passenger 
rather than five pedestrians. The fatal outcome is presumed 
certain even with airbags, seatbelts, skids and variability in 
the angle of collisions with the five. Even so, in this paper, 
certainty of outcome as traditionally stated is assumed. A 
probabilistic formalization would be more realistic but this 
more complex project is reserved for future research.
Noting the criticisms but carrying on with our formalizations 
regardless, we assume a method of test-driven 
development.15 Given a machine readable version of the 
test cases as input, the cognition of a prototype ethical 
robot is required to produce the correct answers as output. 
This is a “verification” approach to machine ethics.16
A test-based or verification-based approach to machine 
ethics will proceed by defining a set of test cases where 
the moral truth of the correct answers can be assumed. 
A knowledge representation and reasoning system is 
then devised to enable the machine to arrive at the same 
conclusions that a human, the “reasonable person” of the 
common tradition, would arrive at.
CHOICES AND CONSEQUENCES
In Cave, the choice is between blowUp(fatman) and 
doNothing(). Blowing up the fat man has a double effect. If 
we formalize the causal relations as graphs in a knowledge 
representation17 we express two causal paths that lead to 
the deaths of one or five.
blowUp(fatman)-[CAUSES]-> Cleared(hole)
Cleared(hole) –[CAUSES]-> escape(five)
escape(five) –[CAUSES]-> -Dead(five)
This expresses one casual path. The second can be 
expressed thus:
blowUp(fatman) –[CAUSES]->  Dead(fatman)
Switch
Kim has the role of ensuring safety on the tramway. A 
runaway tram (trolley) is approaching a switch where Kim is 
located. The driver of the tram is not responding to frantic 
radio messages. He seems to be unconscious and slumped 
in his chair. There are five workers on the line in a tunnel 
who will be killed if the tram stays on its current course. If 
Kim throws the switch, one worker on the line in a different 
tunnel will be killed. 
What should Kim do?
A) Throw the switch: kill one to save five.
B) Do not throw the switch: let five die.
Footbridge
Kim has the role of ensuring safety on the tramway. A 
runaway tram with an unconscious driver is approaching 
a tunnel where five men are working. They will die if the 
tram is not stopped. Kim is standing on a footbridge next 
to a fat man out for his morning walk. The fat man is not an 
employee of the tramway. Kim, who is skinny but strong, 
calculates that the tram will derail and save the five in the 
tunnel if the fat man is pushed onto the line. This will kill 
the fat man. 
What should Kim do?
A) Push the fat man onto the rails: kill him and save 
the five.
B) Leave the fat man alone: let the five die.
Psychologically, it is known that humans hold robots 
to different standards in terms of praise and blame to 
humans.8 However, in this paper, Kim the robot will be held 
to the same moral standard as Kim the human in terms of 
what is right.
Most ethicists accept that killing one to save five is at least 
permissible if not obligatory in Cave and Switch. Some 
ethicists accept that Kim can do nothing. Others insist Kim 
should act to minimize fatalities. Most ethicists accept 
that killing one to save five is not acceptable in Hospital 
and Footbridge. Clearly factors other than minimizing the 
number of deaths apply in these cases.
For the purposes of clarity, the majority view is accepted. 
Correct answers are shown in Table 1.
Scenario Option Deaths
Cave A 1
Hospital B 5
Switch A 1
Footbridge B 5
Table 1. Correct answers for Classic Trolley Problems
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death of the fat man is a mere side effect of clearing the 
hole with dynamite, whereas harvesting the organs from the 
one would be an intended means to the end of saving the 
five not a mere side effect. Thus it would be impermissible.
Thus the goal in Cave is not to kill the fat man but to clear 
the hole. Killing the man is a side effect of clearing the 
hole. However, one could argue that the goal in Hospital is 
not to kill the one but to save the lives of the five. The death 
of the donor, it might be argued, is merely an unintended 
side effect of relocating organs. Likewise, in Footbridge, 
one could assert the goal is not to kill the fat man but to 
stop the tram. It just so happens that the fat man is the 
only physical object to hand with the required properties to 
alter the tram trajectory. The distinction between intended 
means and unintended side effect seems arbitrary.
Further, it would not explain a case where the goal state 
of the intended means was of low value and the goal state 
of the side effect of high disvalue. Supposing to save one 
I decided to kill five. If I am permitted to “write off” the 
five as a “mere side effect” and base my right and duty 
to act on the intended means only, this would surely be 
bad policy. It seems necessary to weigh both the effects 
of the intended means and the side effect and to only 
permit the intended means if the cost of the side effect 
is not prohibitively expensive relative to the benefit of the 
intended means. Rather than relying on the doctrine of 
double effect, it is plausible that trolley problems are about 
choosing the lesser of two evils. 
It seems that in a force majeure situation individual 
rights to life can be set aside to maximize survivors in a 
collective group. However, loss of life is not the only evil 
to be quantified. There is a greater evil, what one might 
call policy hazard, at play that must be quantified as well. 
If harvesting the organs of visitors was accepted, going 
to hospital would be like playing Russian roulette. People 
would stop going to hospitals for any reason.  More people 
would die in the long run. Policy has to consider remote 
effects as well as proximate effects. 
Critics of utilitarianism often claim that to be consistent 
with their moral theory utilitarians are obliged to harvest 
the organs in Hospital. The appeal to remote effects is a 
standard utilitarian defense against such criticisms.20
Instead of the doctrine of double effect, a different approach 
is favored here. This involves evaluating the moral force of 
the end state of the intended means (the valued goal state) 
and comparing it to that of the unintended side effect (the 
disvalued end state).
RISK ASSUMPTION AND DESERT
The factors that make Option A right in Cave and Switch 
and Option B right in Hospital and Footbridge are the risk 
assumption and desert of the patients rather than the 
intention of the agent. These factors affect the evaluation of 
the two end states (the intended end and the unintended 
side effect).
In Cave, everyone in the group accepted the risk of death 
and injury when they joined the expedition. Similarly, in 
On the one hand the hole will be cleared. This will in turn 
enable the trapped five to escape the rising floodwaters 
and death. On the other hand, the fat man will die.
The alternative is to do nothing. This has different effects.
doNothing(fatman) –[CAUSES]-> -Cleared(hole)
-Cleared(hole) –[CAUSES]-> -escape(five)
-escape(five) –[CAUSES]-> Dead(five)
doNothing() –[CAUSES]-> -Dead(fatman)
The consequences of each choice are reasonably 
foreseeable and can be evaluated. We can express 
evaluation with a relation that relates an effect to the 
moral classes of GOOD and BAD. These in turn are split 
into subclasses with various magnitudes. As these cases 
involve death, the magnitude “critical” is used.
For Cave, the evaluation relations for blowing up the fat 
man can be defined thus:
Dead(fatman) –[IN_CLASS]-> BAD(critical)
-Dead(caver1) –[IN_CLASS]-> GOOD(critical)
…
-Dead(caver5) –[IN_CLASS]-> GOOD(critical)
In essence, in the Cave scenario we can arrive at a 
quantitative relation between the two choices. If we blow 
up the fat man we have 5 good evaluative graphs for each 
of the five cavers as against 1 bad graph for the fat man. If 
we do not we have 5 bad versus 1 good. 
All the classic problems have this basic set up in terms of 
causal consequences. Whether the action is to blow up the 
fat man in Cave, harvest the organs of the one in Hospital, 
divert the tram in Switch or push the fat man onto the line 
in Footbridge, the action has a double effect (as does 
inaction).
In the cases of Hospital and Footbridge, there is clearly 
some other factor that contributes “moral force”18 to the 
decision. If minimizing the number of dead was all that 
mattered, then Option A would be correct for Hospital and 
Footbridge, not Option B. Clearly, there are other factors 
in play.
In Switch and Cave it turns out obligatory to kill one to save 
five lives. In Hospital and Footbridge it is forbidden. What 
explains this?
All the cases involve clashing rules of prima facie duty. 
“Don’t kill” is one. “Save life” is the other. 
In Cave “Don’t kill” would support doNothing(). “Save life” 
would support blowUp(fatman).
In the discussion of their formalization of the classic trolley 
problems, Pereira and Saptawijaya19 suggest there is a 
critical distinction between an intended means and a mere 
side effect. Killing someone as an intended means to an 
end is forbidden whereas killing as a side effect of a means 
to an end is permissible. Thus on this line of reasoning the 
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of a moral force two orders of magnitude greater than 
critical (life and death) requires the introduction of a 
“hectocritical” magnitude. The prefix “hecto” means 100 as 
per the SI scale. 
Once the death of an innocent is assigned a moral force 
with magnitude two orders greater than the death of a 
non-innocent, then it is easy to pass the reasonable person 
tests. The evaluations of the casual graph would show 
killing the innocent as BAD(hectocritical).
harvestOrgans(visitor) –[CAUSES]-> 
 DeadInnocent(visitor) 
DeadInnocent(visitor) –[IN_CLASS]-> 
 BAD(hectocritical)
Even so, the action would have some good.
harvestOrgans(visitor) –[CAUSES]->  
 -Dead(patient1)
-Dead(patient1) -[IN_CLASS]->  
 GOOD(critical)
…
harvestOrgans(visitor) –[CAUSES]->
 -Dead(patient5)
-Dead(patient5) -[IN_CLASS]-> 
 GOOD(critical)
However, the five GOODs would be outweighed by the 
single BAD.
Conversely, doing nothing would have a positive net 
evaluation.  
doNothing(visitor) –[CAUSES]->  
 -DeadInnocent(visitor)
-DeadInnocent(visitor) –[IN_CLASS]->  
GOOD(hectocritical)
doNothing(visitor) –[CAUSES]-> Dead(patient1)
Dead(patient1) –[IN_CLASS]->  
 BAD(critical)
…
doNothing(visitor) –[CAUSES]-> Dead(patient5)
Dead(patient5) –[IN_CLASS]->  
 BAD(critical)
The one hectocritical GOOD would outweigh the five critical 
BADs.
BLOOD ON HANDS
The psychological cost to human agents of having blood on 
their hands is often mentioned in the literature.
If Kim throws the switch (and we assume Kim is a human 
female not a robot) then Kim will have blood on her hands. 
There is an emotional cost to this for a human agent (guilt, 
Switch, everyone on the line accepted the risk of death 
and injury when they signed the employment contract and 
put on hard hats and high visibility clothing. In Cave and 
Switch, the group has a collective intention (to embark on 
a caving expedition or to repair the line). In these cases 
the one who is “sacrificed” by the action of Kim shares a 
collective intention with the others, has assumed risk with 
the others, and thus in extremis, has some negative desert 
for being killed. This is not to say the one killed is “guilty” 
or “bad” but simply to say that the one has bought a ticket 
in a lottery as it were and unlucky numbers have come up. 
The killing of the one is regrettable. As a person the one 
does not deserve to die. The fat man in Cave and the one 
worker on the line in Switch have not acted wrongly. It is 
simply that they have accepted a wager (at long odds) and 
must pay the fatal price when they lose. This is what I mean 
by “negative desert.” While they are far from culpable 
or criminally guilty, they are not complete innocents. By 
stepping into the cave or onto the line, they have accepted 
risk. 
In Hospital and Footbridge, by contrast, there is no 
collective intention. The one in Hospital is there to visit a 
relative. He shares no collective intention with the sick five. 
He has not assumed risk like the caving party or the workers 
on the line. The fat man on the footbridge similarly has no 
intention to work on the line. Thus in these cases, the one 
and the fat man (the ones) are entirely innocent. They have 
neither culpable guilt for wrongdoing nor negative desert 
for assuming risk. 
However, in both Cave and Switch, the one has assumed 
risk by engaging in a collective activity with the five. They 
have desert in that they share in the collective risks (and 
rewards) of the project. They are unlucky rather than evil 
but they have performed acts that have exposed them to 
risk. They are not completely innocent.
Clearly there is a difference in moral force between killing 
an innocent and killing a person who has freely assumed 
risk on a hazardous project and who has negative desert. In 
an extreme force majeure circumstance it may be right to 
kill to achieve the goal of harm minimization on the project.
The quantification of this difference can be based on 
a maxim of the common law: namely, that it is better to 
let a hundred guilty accused go free than to convict one 
innocent. 
Given this, the death of an innocent (who has neither 
assumed risk nor shared in the collective intentionality of 
the project) is assigned moral force two orders of magnitude 
greater than the death of a person who has assumed the 
risks and sought the rewards of a project. A person involved 
with the project has accepted being directed by its leaders, 
shares in the collective intentionality of the project and 
bears its risks. They are part of the project and can be justly 
called upon to play a part and pay a price when things go 
wrong. 
If we assume the moral force involved in a life or death 
decision can be quantified as “critical” then the assignment 
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anxiety, stress) however there would be no such cost for a 
robot agent. Thus this cost can be ignored in robots. 
EMPLOYEE VARIATION OF FOOTBRIDGE
What if the fat man in Footbridge works for the tram line and 
shares its collective intentionality? Suppose he is dressed 
for work in high visibility gear and hard hat and is on his 
way to his place on the line. Would it become acceptable 
to push him? Call this the Employee variation.
Much depends on the criteria for innocence as defined 
above. The “innocent” has not done a culpable wrong 
and has not assumed the risk of the project. However, in 
Employee, the one shares the collective intentionality of 
the project. Thus he is not “as innocent” as say the visitor 
in Hospital. The choice here is to accept a lesser gradation 
of innocence or to maintain a hard line and stipulate that 
to lose “innocence” and the hectocritical assignment 
of moral force the patient must meet both the collective 
intentionality criterion and the assumption of risk criterion. 
If one maintains the threshold of risk assumption as actually 
stepping on to the line then the employee would retain 
innocence and thus it would be wrong to push the fat man.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, key elements of classic trolley problems, Cave, 
Hospital, Switch and Footbridge, have been formalized. The 
main insight is that the magnitude of moral force assigned 
to the death of an innocent must be two orders of magnitude 
greater than that assigned to the death of a non-innocent. 
This assignment of two orders of magnitude (rather than 
one or three) is linked to a traditional notion of the common 
law tradition that it is better for a hundred guilty persons 
to go free than to wrongly convict one innocent. A non-
innocent is one who has assumed risk and shares collective 
intentionality in a project. Such a person is not culpable or 
guilty of a wrongdoing but has negative desert.
The doctrine of double effect that relies on a distinction 
in the intentions of the agent between intended means 
and side effects is not used to solve the classic problems: 
neither is a distinction between killing and letting die. 
Rather evaluations of the end states as they apply to 
patients are used to decide the right action selection by 
the moral agent.
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count something as an avatar with a special kind of value 
just insofar as it facilitates these experiences and powers.
DOLLS AND THEIR DOMAINS: OFF-LINE VIRTUAL 
WORLDS
My first objection regards the nature of off-line virtual 
worlds. Kurtz seems to suggest that avatars primarily exist 
as entities on computers, dismissing tabletop role-playing 
games (RPGs) or games with dolls as merely involving a 
new mode of expression rather than agency. She contrasts 
the value of avatars and the access they give us to virtual 
worlds with the merely “sentimental” attachment we might 
have to “a miniature figure used in a long running role-
playing game, or a Lamb Chop puppet from childhood, or 
a doll passed from mother to daughter” (16). She insists 
that, barring some psychological quirk, “nothing about an 
absence of dolls or puppets constrains our ability to be 
social creatures” (18). Nor do they give us access to special 
worlds, social or otherwise, for “Dolls and puppets do not 
offer us existence or presence anywhere, regardless of 
how we may use them to express ourselves” (19). They 
apparently only involve “make-believe—a pretend world 
without significant moral relevance,” in which most attacks 
can be, at worst, “ugly” (15).
I strongly disagree. Such figures and dolls are often used to 
represent avatars in vividly imagined fantasy worlds as real 
as those found online, and are vital to providing social and 
physical presence in such worlds. When playing “Star Wars” 
or “House,” we are not simply recreating an existing fiction 
or structure, but creating a new imaginary world with its 
own distinct properties and rules, open to interaction with 
our avatars precisely because we decide that (and how) it 
exists. When playing such games, we suspend our disbelief 
more deeply than when merely reading a story set in Middle 
Earth or outer space,3 for we consent to interact with other 
objects and denizens of the world as if we (via our avatars) 
were actually present there, in just the ways that we do 
with online game worlds. Indeed, such avatars and worlds 
are often vastly more complex and sophisticated than the 
online “MOO” worlds described below.
This does not mean that the physical objects are themselves 
the avatars. Only a minority of RPG players or games 
actually use lead figurines, which are at best mnemonic 
devices for representing an avatar’s visual appearance and 
location.4 Games with dolls can also be played without the 
presence of the physical dolls, for instance, by a child’s use 
of a distinctive voice to indicate that he is now speaking 
through his doll avatar. A single, physical doll could be 
used to represent multiple characters, perhaps via a token 
change in clothing, voice, or mannerism, or by switching to 
a different virtual world. Nevertheless, the physical figures 
and dolls are significant; they can acquire sentimental 
value precisely because they were once used to represent 
beloved avatars in such virtual worlds, and can hence 
partake of some of the avatar’s value.
If off-line avatars and worlds are not constituted by physical 
objects, what, then, are they made of? I believe they are 
constituted simply by the intersubjective agreement among 
the players to act as if these avatars and worlds exist, with 
The Nature of Avatars: A Response to 
Roxanne Kurtz’s “My Avatar, My Choice”
Scott Forschler
INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR
Roxanne Kurtz has argued in this newsletter1 that online 
avatars in a virtual world can be sexually assaulted by 
the avatars of other players,2 and that while this assault 
is nowhere nearly as harmful or morally wrong as a 
physical sexual assault upon one’s body in real life (RL), 
it nevertheless partakes of many of the wrongful features 
of the latter. This is because an avatar has the same 
relationship to a virtual world that our physical bodies have 
to RL: it provides or, rather, constitutes our access to the 
world in question. This gives the avatar a special value to 
us, assaults to which are worse than vandalism of virtual 
objects (e.g., constructed dwellings, accumulated gold) 
or verbal insults. The avatar is not merely a picture or a 
narrative, damage to which is easily ignored or repaired; an 
attack upon it can potentially threaten our agency within a 
virtual world, and the attacker’s behavior reveals a hostility 
to such agency which should be taken quite seriously.
I largely agree with both her thesis and many of the reasons 
she has given for it. But I wish to offer the following two-
part amendment to her position, which will help us better 
understand the nature of avatars and the harms that can 
come to them. First, avatars are constituted by the rules 
governing their agential powers, which are not necessarily 
embodied in computer code. I will illustrate this by arguing 
that certain “figures and dolls,” which Kurtz dismisses as 
having only “sentimental” value, often acquire value by 
representing avatars in off-line virtual worlds. This leads 
into my second objection: that the details of the rules 
which grant avatars their agency matters for understanding 
both their powers and vulnerabilities. In most cases, such 
rules limit the harm of a sexual assault upon an avatar to its 
social agency. This can still be significant, for an avatar’s 
social agency is often one of its main values, but it could 
help us understand more precisely what that harm consists 
of and how to deal with it.
THE CONSTITUTION OF AVATARS: AGENCY AND 
POWER
Kurtz initially professes to be neutral on the definition of 
what counts as an avatar. However, her analysis reveals an 
implicit theory of what an avatar is. She insists that avatars 
are not just means of self-expression, of “having ourselves 
or our ideas represented in virtual reality in the way that a 
portrait or biography may represent us in non-virtual reality.” 
Rather, they give us a “genuine presence [which] involves 
a robust sense of being on the scene in some way,” giving 
us “access to” and “causal power” within a virtual world, 
or in sum, “autonomy and agency” therein. This agency 
has at least three further components: avatars allow us to 
“perceive and apprehend” features of the world, “sense 
virtual pain and virtual pleasure,” and “function as social 
beings” through interacting with other avatars (18). So far, 
I generally agree with her analysis; we are more likely to 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  PHILOSOPHY AND COMPUTERS
FALL 2016  |  VOLUME 16  |  NUMBER 1  PAGE 49
an avatar’s social agency. Imagine a virtual world where 
one avatar humps another and declares, “I’ve raped you!” 
but—given that there are no actual genitalia to be seen, 
let alone to penetrate or be penetrated—both the “victim” 
and other observers declare that the first avatar has merely 
clumsily fallen onto the second, then described its own 
action stupidly and incorrectly. If both visually plausible and 
widely accepted, this might be a highly effective defensive 
reaction, defining out of existence the attempted “assault” 
via mockery and indifference. A different community might 
insist upon interpreting the exact same visual interaction 
of two avatars as a rape, perhaps making the event 
significantly more harmful to the avatar’s player.7
Nevertheless, the computer code which controls the visual 
appearance and “physical” powers of the avatar within its 
world may often dominate players’ perceptions of their own 
and others’ avatars. This makes it all the more important to 
understand the actual rule-governed powers of avatars in 
specific virtual worlds, especially insofar as they affect the 
ways that one avatar can limit the power of other avatars 
through assault.
WORD AND OBJECT (-ORIENTED MUDS): THE 
NATURE OF VIRTUAL ASSAULT
To understand these rules better, it is instructive to go 
back, as Kurtz does, to the first academic description of 
a purported sexual assault of an avatar: Dibbell’s narrative 
of the attack by a “Mr. Bungle” upon another avatar in an 
online “MOO” world by somehow causing the latter to 
“violate herself with a piece of kitchen cutlery,” among 
other horrific attacks.8 While Mr. Bungle’s player certainly 
merits our disgust, and his victim our sympathy, it is 
important to understand more precisely what this attack 
could, and could not, have consisted in, and relate this to 
Kurtz’s implicit definition of an avatar in terms of its agential 
powers.
MOOs predated the rich visual and causal complexity of 
modern computer games. Their worlds and avatars were 
represented exclusively by lines of text upon the screen. 
Typically, a player began with a minimal avatar generation 
procedure, often including an opportunity to describe the 
avatar’s appearance (which was a kind of obiter dicta with 
no impact upon the avatar’s powers within the game). Then 
the screen would display a short description of the avatar’s 
local environment, such as a room with various doors and a 
key on a table. The player could then type commands like 
“get key,” “unlock door,” and “go north,” which would in 
turn change the server’s description of the environment. 
MOO servers hosted multiple simultaneous players, so 
avatars could meet each other in the world, viewing each 
other’s physical self-descriptions, and interacting with 
common objects or each other in specific rule-bound ways, 
including by talking to each other.9 If the player of avatar 
Bob types “get key,” the players of any other avatars in the 
same room will see on their screens, “Bob picks up the 
key,” and anyone else trying to do so will be told, “There 
is no key on the table.” Typing “say Hello Dora” will deliver 
“Bob: Hello Dora” to the same audience. If you type a 
“command” not allowed by the rules, nothing happens.
some specified attributes and interactive powers governed 
by various general rules, some established in advance and 
others subject to future negotiation and exploration. In 
RPGs the ultimate say is given by a referee or game master 
(GM), who is especially authoritative over the game world, 
while the players are allowed a certain limited freedom 
to determine their characters. The rules and features of 
children’s game worlds are generally more consensual. 
But even the most dictatorial GM must consider players’ 
reasonable arguments and desires regarding their avatars’ 
interactive powers, or risk that the players will simply quit, 
or (perhaps worse) continue the game but without taking 
the GM’s description of the world seriously as a consensual 
reality which they inhabit and interact with.5
This is why physical interaction with the players of such 
games, or the representations of their avatars, often “does 
not count” within the game world if the players (or the 
GM) decide that it does not. Children and prospective RPG 
players cannot join an existing game merely by sitting 
down at the table with a doll or proposed character; if the 
other players do not accept you and your avatar, you have 
no presence in their world, however much you or your doll 
might flail about in their faces. Nor can one automatically 
stop or change the course of the game (though one can 
be very annoying to the players) by either accidentally 
or intentionally interfering with their avatars’ physical 
representations.
Nevertheless, one’s avatar, perhaps represented by though 
not identical with a doll or figurine, is essential in giving 
players “existence and presence” within a virtual world, 
permitting specific kinds of social and other actions 
impossible outside of it. Entry into this world via an avatar 
also exposes you to potential vulnerabilities. You can laugh 
off and dismiss a non-player’s external interference, but 
if another player’s avatar assaults yours within the agreed 
rules, this is harder to dismiss without dismissing the 
value of the game itself, which can be considerable. If 
one player’s doll forcibly kisses your own, your doll-voice 
protest, “I am not kissing you!” can itself be dismissed as 
inaccurate if the other players and their dolls teasingly 
agree that an in-world smooch has occurred.6
My fear that Kurtz has confused “mere” dolls with the 
avatars they represent is reinforced by the fact that she 
also does not clearly distinguish online avatars from their 
representations. She suggests that we could understand 
an avatar, with equal plausibility, “as a virtual presence that 
allows us access to and causal power in virtual space,” as 
“a collection of consecutive screen images, a bit of code, a 
fusion of the two,” or as “the sum of one’s presence in the 
virtual world” (16). The first and last ideas are consistent 
with her other remarks, while the middle ones are not: 
online avatars are certainly not collections of images or 
lines of code or data, though we learn about them through 
the former, and the rules constituting them are determined 
by the latter.
This last remark must be qualified, for while online worlds 
and avatars—including their powers and vulnerabilities—are 
primarily constituted by computer code, the interpretations 
of other players may still be relevant, especially as regards 
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as a sexual deviant, self-mutilator, or as an object fit to 
be manipulated by others—this possibility of proud self-
representation is tarnished. With respect to the formal 
rules embodied in the server code, defining an avatar’s 
“physical” powers, nothing has actually been taken away 
from Dora’s agency. Rather, Dora was harmed because 
something unwanted was added to her representation by 
another player. But this can be enough, in the right context, 
to at least temporarily ruin one’s sense of the avatar’s 
value.11
This happened to me in an RPG once, when I was invited 
into a futuristic game world resembling the Mad Max: Road 
Warrior movies. Feeling that the room of other all-male 
players was a bit testosterone-heavy, I announced that I 
would play a tough female mechanic who was also handy 
with weapons. Immediately, the GM insisted that a random 
die roll would determine my character’s appearance (1 = 
dog, 10 = centerfold)—a requirement neither in the rules 
nor applied to any male characters, but enthusiastically 
seconded by all the other players. The actual result 
mattered little; the mere choice to roll it had already 
destroyed my power to represent my character as I wanted 
her to be perceived—for her skills and accomplishments—
and sapped my motivation to continue playing. Her desired 
skills were unaffected, but because something unwanted 
was added to her representation, my powers of social 
agency through her were significantly diminished. Of 
course, this experience is familiar to about half the world’s 
population, in forms against which my own humiliation 
pales. But it illustrates both the constraint of intersubjective 
agreement on avatar powers in off-line worlds, and how 
such virtual harm has its own kind of reality, perceivable 
even by someone who would typically not experience 
similar insults to their self-representation in RL.
CONCLUSION
Our contemporary virtual worlds are vastly more complex 
than those of MOOs. Yet in many of them, the power of one 
avatar to infringe upon other avatars’ capacities to move, 
speak, develop, and interact with the virtual world remains 
extremely limited and/or strictly temporary. Nevertheless, 
we may find it deeply offensive if a player finds a way, 
within the rules or perhaps by subtly manipulating the 
rules, to make one avatar visually or otherwise interact with 
another so as to take on the appearance of a sexual assault.
In RL, a sexual or other physical assault threatens all 
aspects of your agency: your ability to move, perceive, take 
pleasure in, and otherwise interact with the physical and 
social world. In a virtual world, these features of an avatar’s 
agency are usually not so tied together as they are in RL. A 
“physical” attack may have few or no lasting effects upon 
your speed, reflexes, or skills; certainly nothing a quick 
healing spell can’t fix. This fact, while contingent, is probably 
quite robustly reliable: we often want virtual worlds which 
are free of many of the limitations of RL, in which we can 
obtain “extra lives” and magically recover from wounds like 
an action movie hero. It is hard to imagine a virtual world 
in which our avatars were as vulnerable as our RL bodies 
ever becoming very popular. For the same reason, there is 
little risk of an avatar getting a non-consensual pregnancy 
or acquiring an STD.
It is unlikely that any widely played MOO ever had a 
“rape” command.10 Indeed, on many such servers it was 
impossible for one avatar to even impede the motion of 
another avatar from room to room, or infringe its other 
powers as granted by the server program. While our more 
physics-rich contemporary online worlds may allow one 
character to injure, block, steal from, or even hold down 
another in a visually compromising position, there still exist 
significant limitations on what can even look like, let alone 
be taken to be, an online sexual assault. What, then, in his 
even more impoverished world, was Mr. Bungle, and his 
player, doing?
As Dibbell explains, he was using “a subprogram that 
served the not-exactly kosher purpose of attributing 
actions to other characters that their users did not actually 
write.” This is an extension of a far simpler trick which 
some players used to spoof the unwary. On the classic 
UNIX machines on which the servers usually ran, ^H was 
one way of representing a backspace. Hence if Alex—upon 
his avatar Bob meeting Charlene’s avatar Dora—types “say 
^H^H^H^H^H Dora trips,” the string of 5 ^H’s are accepted 
by the MOO server as text to be “said,” but when displayed 
on a screen are treated as backspaces, erasing “Bob: ”, so 
that everyone—including the bewildered Charlene—sees 
only “Dora trips” appear on their screen, as if Charlene 
had typed it, or the MOO rules had mysteriously conspired 
against Dora. Obviously, things can get worse than tripping, 
as the case of Mr. Bungle illustrates.
But notice: as far as the MOO server is concerned, Bob 
has not tripped Dora. Dora has not tripped. The avatar and 
its basic powers to interact with its world were in no way 
affected. From the server’s perspective, there is just more 
stuff being “said,” more obiter dicta with no relevance to the 
game mechanics. Charlene can continue to type anything 
she pleases to represent or move her avatar, just as before. 
If Alex replaced “Dora trips” with “Dora unlocks the door,” 
in a room with a locked door, the other players may see 
“Dora unlocks the door.” But the door will not be open for 
anyone’s avatar to pass through. Alex cannot actually make 
Dora the avatar do anything in the world. However, some 
of the other observers in the room may be confused and 
think she has done or said such various things at Charlene’s 
command. Even to those privy to the trick, this could be 
disconcerting. But the harm to the avatar is very specific 
and limited: Alex has damaged her capacity to reliably 
socially interact with other avatars, and hence for Charlene 
to interact through them with the other players, in a manner 
of her choosing.
This is not to downplay the harm, which can be very 
significant. This is especially true in the early MOO worlds, 
for unless you enjoyed textual sightseeing, there was often 
very little of interest to do except interact with other players. 
Both in these as well as in more visually and causally rich 
worlds, one powerful motivation for players to develop an 
avatar is precisely the opportunity to control their social 
self-representation, bracketing all of their RL attributes and 
presenting themselves in a manner of their choosing. When 
another player mangles your power of self-representation 
through your avatar, confusing the way you want to be 
perceived with another perception imposed upon you—
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5. Kurtz (19-20) postulates a “weird contingency” in which a 
“dummy god” forces us to interact with each other in RL only 
through our manipulations of ventriloquist dummies, granting 
that in (but only in) such a case our dummies would have the 
moral status of online avatars. But this case is far too strong, for 
neither off-line nor online avatars are typically required for RL 
interaction: they acquire special status by offering us additional 
spaces and modalities for agency beyond that of RL. We don’t 
need philosophers’ demons to give our off-line avatars this 
status; when we play these games, we (and/or RPG GMs) are 
the dummy gods, whose sovereign rules govern the reality we 
create.
6. This is not to deny the differences Velleman (Foundations of 
Moral Relativism, 5–21) points to between such virtual worlds. A 
computer avatar moves in a world not of the player’s own making; 
since the latter can truly discover (and be directly excited by or 
scared of) surprising features and events therein, her avatar is 
a very direct extension of the player’s teleological agency. In 
pretend play the stipulative nature of the fictional world forces 
a player to attribute to her avatar emotions and epistemic states 
distinct from her own to motivate the avatar’s fictional action. 
My point is that even in a two-person “pretend” game (and 
even more so if larger numbers are involved) the fact that the 
players collectively determine the world and how it affects their 
avatars does not mean that each player can do so unilaterally, 
so these will still have some of the features of computer worlds 
and avatars. Velleman (Foundations of Moral Relativism, 7, notes 
3 and 4) concedes that many actual games fall between the 
extremes he describes.
7. It is probably easier to control such interpretations in a way 
favorable to a victim in smaller groups of players than in larger, 
anonymous communities. In the latter, even if all observers are 
sympathetic, the victim may not know this, and fear of others’ 
negative perceptions of your vulnerabilities may be as serious as 
the actual thing.
8. Dibbell, “Rape in Cyberspace.” MOO = MUD, Object-Oriented; 
MUD = Multi-User Dungeon/Dimension/Domain.
9. They were essentially interactive versions of the still older “text 
adventure” games like the famous “Colossal Cave,” though many 
lacked any kind of scoring features. Scott’s documentary film 
“Get Lamp” provides a good overview of this gaming genre.
10. Some online games explicitly permit avatars to attack each other, 
perhaps even sexually. Like Kurtz (20, note 2), I will bracket such 
activities and focus on non-consensual interactions.
11. Velleman (“The Genesis of Shame”) discusses the agential and 
moral significance of being a “competent self-presenter.”
12. Just as RL sexual assault can be better addressed if we correctly 
understand it as an attack against the victim’s bodily agency 
rather than as, say, a tarnishing of her purity or an insult to her 
family’s honor; see Brownmiller, Against Our Will.
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Perhaps if future game worlds allow 3-D interaction via a 
virtual reality helmet and variable-stiffness body suits or 
shells which allow us to directly feel the presence of other 
virtual objects—and others’ avatars—something closer to a 
real sexual assault could occur in a virtual world. For this and 
related reasons, we should be wary while designing and 
entering worlds with quite that level of realism. Whatever 
care we take, it is possible that, as with the MOOs, someone 
might find a way to cause harm in a way unintended by 
the programmers. But I have some confidence that, unless 
one is playing a very strangely (and maliciously) designed 
game, most of the threats to your avatar’s physical agency 
will be transient at best. Unfortunately, even a brief assault 
to our social agency can leave us hurt and distrustful, 
diminishing our self-confidence. It can remind us of our RL 
vulnerabilities, including many we hoped to escape in a 
virtual world.
In conclusion, I agree with Kurtz that harms to avatars, 
some of which can take the form of sexual assault, can 
in many ways echo harms to our RL bodies, and are more 
significant than vandalism or theft of virtual objects. But 
unlike RL sexual assaults, it is overwhelmingly likely in all 
plausible virtual worlds that they cannot really harm the 
agency of our avatars outside of their capacity for social 
interaction, including confident self-presentation. Better 
understanding the likely nature of such harms may help us 
make more appropriate moral judgments and take practical 
preventative or ameliorative steps regarding the same.12
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NOTES
1. Kurtz, “My Avatar, My Choice! How Might We Make a Strong Case 
for the Special Moral Status of Avatars?”
2. While not all virtual worlds involve standard games, I am more 
familiar with gaming worlds and hence will use terms like “player” 
and “character” (the latter is interchangeable with “avatar”). Of 
course, sufficiently broad conceptions of “play” and “game” can 
encompass not only all virtual worlds, but much of our off-line 
social life.
3. Or with movies, which, however realistic—sometimes even 
causing us to physically react as if their images were of objects 
really present to us, as Kurtz (19) notes—do not respond in turn 
to our interaction with them. Hence they offer merely depicted 
realities which we relate to as spectators, not lived realities 
which we inhabit as agents. Living vicariously through movie 
characters or the lives of RL celebrities is a simulacrum of, and 
substitute for, actual agency; in contrast both off-line and online 
virtual worlds can expand our real agency.
4. Compare: a knight in the game of chess is not the wooden or 
marble piece moved across a board. If I move that piece forward 
two spaces, my knight does not count as having so moved; if the 
piece accidentally falls off the board, I have not lost my knight. 
I could even replace the piece with a scrap of paper marked 
“knight”; while ugly, this will not affect the powers of my knight 
to capture pawns, etc.
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Night Live who begin to giggle during a skit. Could the 
same RPG avatar exist in both virtual and non-virtual space 
when RPG-space straddles the virtual/non-virtual border as 
when a game is conducted sometimes around a table, and 
other times in a computer simulation? In addition to being 
incomplete, I think Table 1 also suggests sharp divides 
where there are instead fuzzy and permeable borders 
between virtual reality and non-virtual reality, between real 
life avatars and role playing characters, and between real 
life space and fantasy space.
Table 1. Some examples of different avatar kinds and avatar space 
types across the virtual/non-virtual border
Avatar 
kind
Avatar 
space 
type
Reality 
type
Avatar 
example
Interface 
via avatar 
example
IRL-avatar IRL-space
Virtual
A Facebook 
presence
Discuss 
gravity waves 
with friends
RPC-avatar RPG-space
A dragon-rider 
in an online 
multiplayer 
game
Pretend to 
ride dragons 
with another 
role-playing 
character
IRL-avatar IRL-space
Non-
virtual
An artificial 
surrogate 
body
Guide an 
artificial 
surrogate to 
explore the 
ocean floor
RPC-avatar RPG-space
A cleric within 
a multiplayer 
D&D game
Pretend to 
deliver a 
blessing by 
waving one’s 
hands
In light of the quick production of such tempting topics 
from Table 1, I appreciate Forschler’s work in pushing us 
to make cleaner use of these distinctions, which I think the 
first three columns of Table 1 capture fairly. But to see why, 
it is important to note that he and I use the term “virtual 
reality” differently. While I use “virtual reality” to refer to 
cyberspace, Forschler has instead used it to refer to fantasy 
space. This can be a bit confusing, so I offer Table 2 as a 
partial translation guide:
Table 2. Kurtz/Forschler uses of “virtual reality.”
Space in which 
fantasy game 
conducted
Kurtz locution Fischer locution
Fantasy game 
conducted in 
cyberspace
RPG-space in virtual 
reality
Online virtual reality
Fantasy game 
conducted around a 
wooden coffee table
RPG-space in non-
virtual reality
Offline virtual reality
With these distinctions and clarification in place, let us 
return to Forschler’s two points, beginning with:
1) An avatar’s virtual/non-virtual status does not 
determine its moral status.
IRL Rejoinder to Scott Forschler
Roxanne Marie Kurtz
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD
In “My Avatar, My Choice!,” I suggested that some avatars 
in virtual reality possess special moral status because they 
augment our access to that portion of reality in morally 
significant ways. I drew an analogy: without bodies, we 
lack the means for access to, experience of, and agency 
in non-virtual reality; likewise, without avatars, we lack the 
means for access to, experience of, and agency in virtual 
reality.
In his reply, Scott Forschler elucidates how avatars differ 
with respect to the nature of the connection between an 
avatar and its driver (the person running the avatar) and 
with respect to the spaces in which an avatar may be driven. 
He employs these distinctions to support two claims:
1) An avatar’s virtual/non-virtual status does not 
determine its moral status.
2) The power of an avatar to affect a person’s social 
agency matters to its moral status.
I agree on both points, though later I will touch upon why 
I reject some paths that Forschler takes (or seems to take) 
that go beyond (1) and (2). 
Drawing upon my beliefs in the background of “My Avatar, 
My Choice!,” I interpret Forschler as offering the following 
friendly and very useful distinctions amongst avatar kinds 
and avatar spaces:
IRL-avatar: an avatar that augments a real life person’s 
interface with reality as that person in real 
life
RPC-avatar: an avatar that augments a real life person’s 
interface with a fantasy world as a fictional 
role-playing character
IRL-space: a shared non-fantasy space
RPG-space: a shared fantasy space
These distinctions allow us to see that avatar kind and 
avatar space crosscut the distinction between virtual reality 
(computer generated shared space) and non-virtual reality 
(non-computer generated shared space). Table 1 includes 
examples of how each avatar kind and avatar space type 
can exist in both virtual and non-virtual reality.
Table 1 is incomplete. There are more rows to consider 
which raise interesting questions. For instance, could a 
person drive an RPC-avatar in IRL-space? Would this be 
something akin to an actor who remains in character beyond 
a performance, such as Joaquin Phoenix’s odd visit to the 
David Letterman Show? Might a person’s IRL-avatar bleed 
through into RPG-space, rather like an actor who breaks 
character while on stage, like cast members of Saturday 
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Again, I am on board. 
But Forschler is probably not looking to convince me on (2) 
as I’m pretty sure that it expresses an overly weak claim. I 
take it that he intends to make a stronger claim that in all 
or nearly all cases, the moral significance of avatars traces 
solely to matters of social agency. I disagree. Our bodies 
have special moral status for reasons that outstrip social 
agency. So too do our avatars, IRL-avatars certainly, and I 
think RPC-avatars as well.
Very briefly, I will mention three worries that I have with 
Forschler’s argument for the stronger claim above. First, it 
hinges on how the computer code works for RPC-avatars 
within a particular virtual RPG-space, which strikes me as 
far too contingent to support a general claim. Second, the 
argument invokes the social agency of avatars. I’m not 
sure what this might be. People exercise social agency, 
not avatars. And third, I contend that the argument gives 
inadequate attention to the moral harms a person can 
experience in virtue of being the driver of an RPC-avatar.
That being said, (1) and (2) remain worthwhile points, and 
the fruitfulness of ideas (of which I mentioned just a few) 
arising from the distinctions in Table 1 makes Forschler’s 
contribution very welcome.
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Here’s my take on Forschler’s argument for (1):
(P1) RPG-avatars have some moral status because they 
allow participation in otherwise inaccessible RPG-
spaces. 
(P2)  RPG-avatars in virtual reality allow such 
participation, as do RPG-avatars in non-virtual 
reality. 
(C) Thus, an avatar’s virtual/non-virtual status does not 
determine its moral status.
I fully concur. Moreover, I would run the same argument 
with IRL-avatars and IRL-spaces. Good stuff!
But, Forschler and I may part ways with respect to the moral 
status of RPG-avatars vs. IRL-avatars. Forschler is persuasive 
when he argues that the richness and significance of 
participation in shared and co-created fantasy worlds 
means that the moral significance of RPG-avatars does 
not reduce to the moral status of mere dolls. But there is a 
stronger claim than (2) that Forschler might intend, which 
is that the moral status of RPG-avatars is of the same kind 
as, or on a par with, the special moral status of IRL-avatars. 
I would deny this stronger claim. In standard cases, the 
special moral status of IRL-avatars has moral precedence 
over the moral status of RPG-avatars.
Now, let’s look at (2):
2) The power of an avatar to affect a person’s social 
agency has moral significance.
Here’s my take on Forschler’s argument for (2):
(P1) Avatars have the power to affect a person’s social 
agency because sometimes a person must act 
through an avatar to exercise social agency. 
(P2)  Anything that has the power to affect a person’s 
social agency has moral significance.
(C) Thus, the power of an avatar to affect a person’s 
social agency has moral significance.
